

A STUDY OF ŚĪVAJÑĀNA SIDDHIYĀR PARAPAKKAM



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Dr. R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

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FOREWORD

Like other orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, Śaiva Siddhānta also has a basic philosophical work, the *Śivajñāna-bodham* of Meykaṇḍār, which contains the essential teachings of the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas*. Two factors contributed to the development of the schools of Indian Philosophy. One was the commentarial tradition. The basic work of each school is in the form of *sūtras*. The *sūtra*-work of each school is elucidated by a commentary. There is, for example, Vātsyāyana's commentary on Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra*. In the case of Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtra*, we have more than one commentary on it. Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, and others wrote elaborate commentaries on the *Vedānta-sūtra* from the standpoint of the tradition each belonged to. Meykaṇḍār's *Śivajñāna-bodham*, which consists of twelve *sūtras*, has a commentary called *Śivajñāna-siddhiyār* in Tamil written by Aruṇandi. The Śaiva Siddhānta tradition attaches great importance to this commentary on the *Śivajñāna-bodham* coming as it does from one who was not only a contemporary of the author of the *Śivajñāna-bodham*, but who was also one of his disciples. Tradition has it that Aruṇandi wrote his commentary at the behest of his *guru*, Meykaṇḍadevar. The *Śivajñāna-siddhiyār* in its turn was commented upon by others of the Siddhānta tradition. Thus, the commentarial tradition of each school has contributed to the growth and enrichment of each school.

Every philosopher worth the name has not only a tradition and a point of view to elucidate and justify, but also other philosophical traditions with varying stand points to react to. The exchange of philosophical views through objections and replies, counter-objections and rejoinders, is another factor which has contributed to the development of Indian philosophy. Every philosophical treatise in India is both expository and polemical: it not only expounds and justifies, with great care and insight, its central teaching supported by *pramāṇas* such as *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda*, but also criticizes the teachings of others

on the authority of *pramāṇas*. This is as much true with regard to the *Śivajñāna-siddhiyār* as it is with regard to any other important philosophical work.

Aruṇandi's *Śivajñāna-siddhiyār* contains two parts. The first part of this work called "*Parapakkam*" (Sanskrit: *parapakṣa*) is devoted to the refutation of the views of others, while the second part called "*Supakkam*" (Sanskrit: *svapakṣa*) elucidates and vindicates the standpoint of Śaiva Siddhānta. In this work there are altogether 629 verses of which 301 are devoted to the refutation of fourteen philosophical positions of *nāstika* and *āstika* schools of the Indian tradition. While there are many commentaries on the *Supakkam* portion of the work, there is only one commentary on the *Parapakkam* written by Tattuvaprakāśar.

So far there has been no exposition in English of the *Parapakkam* of the *Siddhiyār*. The present volume by my colleague, Dr. R. Gopalakrishnan, who is a specialist in Śaiva Siddhānta, attempts to elucidate, by closely following the *Siddhiyār*, the standpoint of other schools, as advocated by them and the objections thereto from the standpoint of Śaiva Siddhānta. I am happy to commend this book to the attention of scholars and others interested in Śaiva Siddhānta vis-a-vis other Indian philosophical schools.

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

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PREFACE

In this monograph I have attempted to set forth Aruṇandi's presentation and refutation of other schools of thought. As is usual with the classical philosophers, Aruṇandi's prime concern is to show the inadequacies found in the philosophical tenets of the non-Śaiva philosophical schools as a prelude to the establishment of the Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy, *viz.*, *Supakkam*.

In this work, I have not enquired whether Aruṇandi's presentation of the views of other schools is authentic, but I have confined myself to the views of alien schools as presented and refuted by him. I consider that this work will enable the scholars to know the standpoint of Śaiva Siddhānta with reference to other systems. I am sure that this work will serve as a prelude to a better understanding of the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār Supakkam*.

I am thankful to the Vice-Chancellor and the authorities of the University of Madras for permitting me to write this monograph. I thank Dr. R. Balasubramanian, Director, Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, for his guidance and encouragement. Let me express my gratitude to Dr. V. A. Devasenapathi, Former Director, Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras for his invaluable guidance. I am also grateful to Dr. V. Rathinasabapathy, Professor & Head, Department of Śaiva Siddhānta, University of Madras, for having clarified many points in the text. Let me also convey my thanks to Dr. P.K. Sundaram, Formerly Professor, Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy and to Mr. P. Krishnan Lecturer, Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras for their valuable suggestions in preparing the manuscripts. I thank M/s. Avvai Achukkoodam for executing the work on time.

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R. GOPALAKRISHNAN

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1

SAIVA SIDDHANTA AND OTHER SYSTEMS

Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy treats other schools of thought as heretical or alien doctrines (*Parapakkam*). Before it establishes its settled conclusion or accomplished end (*Supakkam*), it distinguishes itself from the non-Śaiva schools and the other Śaivite schools. Aruṇandi in his *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* offers a systematic treatment of both *Parapakkam* and *Supakkam*. The *Parapakkam* is devoted to the exposition and criticism of many rival schools of thought from the standpoint of Śaiva Siddhānta. The other works included in the *Meykaṇḍa Śāstrās*, except the *Sankarṣa Nirākaraṇam* do not deal with the other schools of thought so explicitly and so systematically as *Śivajñāna-Siddhiyār*.

Lokāyata, Jainism, and the four schools of Buddhism, viz., Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika Vaibhāṣika and Yogācāra are regarded as the outermost schools (*purappuraccamayam*), since they not only deny the authority of the *Vedas* but also do not have belief in God. Those schools which accept the authority of the *Vedas* and do not accept the Āgamic authority are considered as the outer schools (*puraccamayam*) such as Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, Ekāṇmavāda, Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Pāñcarātra. A few types of Śaivism known as Pāśupata, Mahāvrata, Kāpāla, Vāma, Bairava and Aikkyavāda come under the inner schools (*ahappuraccamayam*) since they do not agree to the scheme of categories put forth by the Siddhānta, though they regard and venerate Śiva as the Supreme God. As the innermost schools (*ahaccamayam*) we

have Pādānavāda, Bhedavāda, Śivasamavāda, Śiva-saṅkrāntavāda, Īsvara avikāravāda and Śivādvaita. These schools accept all the three categories of the Siddhānta, but in defining some of them they differ from it.

In fact, Aruṇānandi has not made the above classification. On the contrary, he has chosen some systems of philosophy prevalent during his time which he considered worth refuting. It is Śivajñāna Munivar,¹ the reputed commentator of the *Śivajñāna Bodham*, who, in his *Magnum opus*, the *Śivajñāna Māpāḍiyam* explicitly classifies the rival schools as inner, outer, innermost and outermost. While interpreting a word 'உறவு' which occurs in the *avaiyaḍakkam* (homage to the assembly) of the *Śivajñāna Bodham*, he says that the word may mean the scornful language directed against the outer schools and the slander usage of language. Among these schools of thought, the Lokāyata, the four schools of Buddhism and Jainism come under *purappuraccamayam* because they consider their own scriptures as basic texts and follow a path prescribed by them, though they belong to the heterodox schools which decry the authority of the *Vedas* and *Śivāgamas*.

Though the six systems starting from Tārīkika to Pāñcarātra generally regard the *Veda* as the *pramāṇa*, the Tārīkikar among them do not hold *pramāṇiyam* and derive meaning contrary to Vedic statements. The Mīmāṃsakas accept the *karmakāṇḍa* of the *Vedas* and reject the *jñānakāṇḍa*. The Ekāṇmavādin gives much importance to the *jñānakāṇḍa* and sets aside the *karmakāṇḍa*. The rest among the Ekāṇmavādins cull out suitable passages from the *Vedas* to suit their philosophic standpoint and also approve as basic texts some scriptures which are anti-Vedic. Since all these schools depreciate *Śivāgamas*, they have been named as *puraccamayam*. Śivajñāna Munivar also elucidates the grounds to consider the schools under *ahappuraccamayam* and *ahaccamayam* and also differentiates these schools from Śaiva Siddhānta.

It is traditionally held that Aruṇāndi was the preceptor to the father of Meykaṇḍār, but after listening to the enlightened utterances of Meykaṇḍār, Aruṇāndi became Meykaṇḍār's disciple. In fact, the *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār Supakkam* is an elaborate verse commentary on the *Śivajñāna Bodham* of Meykaṇḍār. Meykaṇḍār, the exponent of Śaiva Siddhānta, as a submission to the academy (*avaiyaḷakkam*) says. "Those that realise their own true nature first and then understand the nature of the Supreme (by Spiritual experience) of which the individual selves are the eternal servants, are one with the Supreme. So they have us as their servant and will not find fault with our system. Those that do not understand themselves cannot understand the nature of the Divine; as these do not agree among themselves and unite, their criticism we heed not." According to one saying, this verse inspired Aruṇāndi to discuss the views of those who do not realize themselves and accept Lord Śiva as their Master. The *Parapakkam* has been composed in poetry to bring to light the implications of the phrase 'தம்மைபுணராள்' (those who do not realize themselves) mentioned by Meykaṇḍār. It examines the views of other schools of philosophy and refutes them from the standpoint of the Siddhānta.

The Lokāyatas never consider themselves as spiritual entities; the Buddhists, Sāṅkhyas and the Māyāvādins do not realise themselves as the possessors of qualities (குணிப்பொருள்) and the followers of other philosophical schools do not realise themselves as the servants of the Lord. Though the Pāñcarātrins and the Śivādvitains regard themselves as the servants of the Lord, the former attributes subtle dimention (*anuparimāṇam*) to themselves and transformation (*pariṇāmanam*) to the Lord and the latter questions the *citsakti* of the Lord and accept transformation. Hence the above two systems also do not realise themselves. While presenting the views of the alien schools and criticising them, the author expounds the philosophical tenets of Śaivism. Such an approach of Aruṇāndi gives room for

the criticism that the *Supakkam* is the repetition of the *Parapakkam*. In this connection, it is worthwhile to consider the justification offered by Devasenapathi: "Having set forth his position, the Siddhāntin proceeds to examine criticism thereof by the followers of other schools. In the *Parapakkam*, Aruṇandi stated the views of other schools and refuted them from his standpoint. Here the procedure is different. He states his position and meets objection brought against it. Thus, the charge that the *Supakkam* repeats what was said in the *Parapakkam* is untenable."

Aruṇandi considers and evaluates the philosophical doctrines of the outermost and the outer schools such as Lokāyata, the four schools of Buddhism, the two sects of Jainism, the two schools of Pūrva Mīmāṃsa, Śabda Brahmanavāda, Māyāvāda, Bhāskara school, Nirīśvara Sāṅkhya and Pāñcarātra. Among the outer schools, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems or Tarka schools as they are called, do not find a place. Aruṇandi was the first ācārya to present the epistemology of Śaiva Siddhānta in the name of *Aḷavai*. It is, however, strange to note that he did not take into account the logical system in Indian Philosophy, viz., Nyāya. Perhaps, he might have been interested in the metaphysical views of Indian systems alone for his work. However, he gives a good account of the epistemology of the Lokāyata and Sautrāntika. Among the four schools of Buddhism, the author elaborates the views of the Sautrāntika system in thirty one verses and brings out the philosophical untenability in forty verses. He puts forth the standpoints of the other three schools in one verse each and refutes them in one or two verses. The reason for such a treatment in the words of Paranjoti is that "The Sautrāntika Buddhist believing neither in God nor soul, which to the Siddhāntin are important entities, and repudiating the authority of the Vedas, which to the Siddhāntin are authoritative books develops a system of thought that calls for severe criticism from the Siddhāntin." While discussing the Pāñcarātra school, the author presents only the

purāṇic and legendary informations and points out the inconsistencies therein. Probably during the time of the author the systematic exposition of the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy and relevant texts might not have been available. Umāpati Śivācārya too, in his *Śaṅkarapanirākaraṇam* takes up Advaita for criticism in the outer schools. Aikyavāda Śaivism has been considered in the inner schools. The rest of the work concentrates on the presentation and criticism of the innermost schools. Here also we find no reference to the Viśiṣṭādvaita philosophy.

According to Maraijñāna Desikar, one of the commentators on the *Siddhiyār*, Aruṇandi based his *Parapakkam* on the following works:

- (i) Śaṅkarācārya's Śārva Darsna Saṅgraha.
- (ii) Śarvamatopanyāsa.
- (iii) Rāmanādācārya's Paramatanirākaraṇa
- (iv) Sarvānma Śambhu's Siddhānta Dīpikā.
- (v) Agorasivācārya's Siddhāntārtha Samuccaya.⁵

But nowhere in the *Parapakkam* does Aruṇandi refer to these works. Aruṇandi had to master the scriptures which were in Sanskrit and especially those with the doctrines of rival schools, to reflect over them carefully as to find out the defects and refute their arguments wherever possible from the Siddhānta point of view. He had to present their stand first and then to examine them in Tamil, that too in a poetic form in the *Siddhiyār Parapakkam*. Our endeavour here is to study on the presentation of alien faiths and refutation as well, before the author could establish the Siddhānta doctrines.

The *Parapakkam* of *Sivajñāna Siddhiyār* commences with invocatory verses addressed to Lord Gaṇapati and other gods to bless the author for the successful completion of his laudable work. In keeping with tradition, Aruṇandi invokes the blessings of Lord Gaṇapati to remove the obstacles that may stand in the way of accomplishing his task. One may wonder why a scholar of repute yearns for

the Lord to begin his work. It is to be understood that even the philosophical texts need divine grace for clarity and cogency. Lord Gaṇesa is said to be the Lord of Wisdom. Not only does He free the fetters but also grants perfect Wisdom to those who pray to Him. As the author has to triumph over his philosophical rivals and to establish his philosophic tradition, there is no wonder in his invoking the grace of Lord Gaṇapati.

By way of submitting himself to the assembly, the author makes an apologetic preface. The attempt to disclose the ancient Śaivite tradition which is seldom known to Viṣṇu, Brahmā, and to the four *Vedas*, in the presence of the sages on earth who have mastered the *Āgamas*, *Vedas* and other scriptures and ever contemplate on the Holy Feet of Lord Śiva, is like comparing the merged waters of the seven different oceans to that of the water remaining under the cloven hoof of a cow. Again on the glorious world parents rejoice at the unmeaningful utterances of their affectionate children as if they have amassed wealth in abundance. Likewise, living in wisdom, the scholars of Tamil Language seldom find fault with the lyrics of the author, but rather appreciate.

As a prelude to his work, Aruṇandi states the grandeur of his work. The *Āgamas*, being revealed by the effulgent Lord with perfect wisdom, though differ in many respects, culminate in agreeable theme, even as many paths lead to the same village. The unenlightened people, instead of following the *Āgamic* path, like mad men, do not find the proper path of perfection, but fall back towards those who proclaim that they have found out the path leading to liberation. This attitude is like the attempt of a man who intends to reach the Great Meru mountain, but takes a different direction and falls into the ocean. Further, on this antique universe the author intends to elucidate in his work about the Lord Supreme, His revelations, logic, objects known, the path to be followed, the nature of bondage and liberation etc., setting aside the mirage-like false faiths through questions and replies as a prelude to realise the path of perfect wisdom.

2

LOKAYATA (CARVAKA) SCHOOL

Cārvāka, the crest-gem of the atheistic school, follows the doctrine of Bṛahaspati. The principles of this system are hardly found to be incorrect, since the majority of living beings hold by the current refrain -

While life is yours, live joyously
None can escape Death's searching eye;
When once this frame of ours they burn;
How shall it e'er again return?"

"The original work of the Cārvākas was written in *sūtras* by Bṛahaspati. Jayanta and Guṇaratna quote two *sūtras* from it. Short accounts of this school may be found in Jayanta's *Nyāyamañjari*, Mādhava's *Śarvadarśana Saṁgraha* and Guṇaratna's *Tarkaraḥśyadīpika*. *Mahābhārata* gives an account of a man called Cārvāka meeting Yudhiṣṭhira."

This school of thought treats wealth and pleasure alone as the genuine ends of life. As the ideas of future world and existence are totally rejected, it concentrates on worldly pleasures and entertainments. Hence it is called Lokāyata - a name well in accord with the thing signified. Lokāyata may be etymologically analysed as "prevalent in the world" (*loka* and *āyata*).³ The Cārvāka attunes to materialism as a more viable means for livelihood than spiritual life. The fundamental proposition with which the Cārvāka begins his philosophy is 'eat drink and be merry.' To substantiate

this initial dictum he organises his thoughts in a way lacking logical rigour. It is crude materialism unsupported by sound metaphysics and moral codes. In epistemology, the Cārvāka holds that that alone is true which is perceived and anything which transcends perception is doubtful, unreliable and undependable. The validity of even inference is questioned, not to speak of other *pramāṇas*. All the metaphysical doctrines involve conception and not perception and hence they are eliminated from the purview of philosophy. Consciousness is reduced to matter in proportionate combinations. Among the four major values of human life (*puruṣārthas*), the Cārvāka accepts only *kāma* or sensuous pleasure as having the highest value while *arthā* or wealth is a means to attain *kāma*. *Dharma*, or righteousness in the accepted sense of the term is rejected. *Mokṣa* is altogether rejected as unattainable.

Aruṇandi takes up this school first in his treatise in the name of Lokāyata. The followers of the Lokāyata according to him, neither has the intelligence nor the power to understand the import of the theory promulgated by Brahaspati, the priest of Indra. He considers this theory as mainly intended for the sensuous pleasure of human beings.

Epistemology

The only *pramāṇa* (*aḷavai*) acceptable to the Lokāyata is perception (*kāṭchi*) which, when united with the mind etc., is of six kinds.¹ It does not require inference (*anumāna*) and testimony (*śabda*). The objects of perception are only the elements, four in number, which are known through their inherent natures such as hardness, coldness, heat and diffusiveness.

Earth	(தலம்)	is perceived through hardness,
Water	(புனல்)	is perceived through coldness,
Fire	(கனல்)	is perceived through heat and
Air	(காற்று)	is perceived through diffusiveness.

The fifth element, *viz.*, ether or *ākāśa* is not accepted since it is not susceptible to perception. The following are

the qualities of elements: Earth has smell (நாற்றம்); water, taste (இரதம்); fire, form (உருவம்) and air, touch (பரிசம்). Just as several products like pot etc., are made from clay, even so the things of the universe are produced due to the union of these elements among themselves. Even as bubbles are formed in water, intellect (புத்தி), character (குணம்), five senses (ஐம்பொறி) and organs of wisdom (புலன்) are formed owing to the interaction of the elements. Both animate and inanimate beings are the products of matter.⁵

The Lokāyata, according to Arulnandi, considers the basic structure of the human body to be caused by the principle of primal matter. As long as there is unity among the elements, the senses, sensations, intellect, etc., persist. Even if one element is separated from the rest, the senses etc., will become inert (eventually destroyed are the other senses, qualities, intellect, etc.). By the same procedure all the movable and immovable objects perish. When the effects such as form, quality etc., disappear, they are resolved into their cause, *viz.*, the four elements. The Cārvāka asserts that the highest wisdom lies in realising this process of origin and decay of human organism.

Arulnandi so far has presented the salient features of the Lokāyata. Now he proceeds to discuss the criticisms levelled by the Lokāyata against those who have different accounts of reality. According to the Cārvāka, creation and dissolution are explained in terms of association and dissociation of the four elements. No doctrine like God, *karma*, *ātman*, etc., is warranted. Any attempt to postulate such things and claim to know them would be like the act of the son of a barren woman climbing on the hare's horn and plucking the sky flower. Here the Cārvāka ridicules the attitude of the theists who make futile attempts to know the metaphysical entities like God, soul, etc. These are all due to conceptualisations which fall outside the scope of perception and empirical verification. Since the validity of inference is rejected, inferential knowledge of such entities

is also not accepted. According to the Lokāyata, each element is a deity; the defects in the elements cause *karma* and consciousness produced by the combination of the elements constitute *ātman*. Other than these, there is no necessity to postulate God, *karma* and soul.

Karma

The Lokāyata asks those who believe that *karmas* of the past births cling fast to a person in his subsequent births, how this is possible since all the *karmas* perish when the body is destroyed? To say that the *karmas* subsist in the subtle body when the gross body perishes, is like saying that the extinct flame of a lamp illumines in the absence of a wick. The supporters of the *karma* theory may argue that the *karmas* operate like the decomposed straw and plants to grow. To this the Lokāyata replies that the decomposed straw and plants are beneficial wherever they are manured and not in other places. This is like saying that the hungry man's eating is beneficial to his excreta, but not to his blood.

The theists may ascertain that the non-identical nature of body, consciousness and intelligence of individuals are attributed to the active role of *karma*. If so, how are we to account for the variation in the five fingers? What *karmas* had they accumulated? The dissimilarity in them is attributed by the Lokāyata to the proportionate increase or decrease in the constituent elements and not to *karma*. Further, if pleasure and pain are caused by *karma*, then what, sort of *karma* the pure water has performed (either good or bad) to mix with sandal paste and with fire? It is to be understood, says the Lokāyata, that objects have natural qualities according to the nature of elements and *karma* does not come into the picture at all. For example, leather etc. shrink in the presence of fire and loosen in water since the laws of matter are operative. Again, a person may feel pleasure to smear fragrant sandal water and may totally feel discomfort to be near fire.

Danial of Soul

According to the Cārvāka, the soul is only a conscious living body and nothing more than this can be presumed. The soul does not exist independent of the body. Even as the betel leaves, nuts and lime produce red colour when chewed, consciousness emerges in the body due to proper combination of the elements. If human soul is said to exist, then it should be given to any one of the six modes of perceptions. One should not attempt to establish the existence of the soul by means of the deluding scriptural authority. Such an attempt resembles the act of those who measure the hare's horn and claim validity for that.

No-God Theory

If God is formless (*arūpam*), then He should be like the non-intelligent sky. On the contrary, if He has form (*rūpam*), then He should have a body made up of elements and He becomes one with the object of the world. If formless (*rupārūpam*) is his stature, one cannot conceive such a combination. For 'is it possible to suspend a stone (form) in the sky (formless)?' asks the Cārvāka.

The Philosophy of the Lokāyata

As the Lokāyata is committed to materialism, he interprets the *Veda* in terms of materialism and says that the *Vedas* declare that the earth evolves into food, and from food comes the body and from body arises intellect and from intellect emerges the mind. The people on earth, instead of following the path of materialism, follow various delusive paths and suffer needlessly. The real end of life is sensuous enjoyment which is available readily on this earth. Even after knowing this, people ignore this fact and aspire for bliss in heaven as informed by others and suffer by performing austerities. Such persons are like those who search for water elsewhere (probably a mirage) while water is available before them, only to die of great thirst.

The Lokāyata considers Vāmī (Vāmatantri) as his bosom friend since he pursues like him the paths of murder and

robbery and vices which the cowards call evil. He seeks the company of girls with lovely braids of hair. Rudra, Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Indra achieved greatness because of their intimate connection with womenfolk (goddesses). If one aspires to be like them, the only way suggested is to be in the company of women. When the womenfolk develop bitterness of temper, it is the duty of a person to dispel their anger and get joy in their company. Those who do not follow these means of the Lokāyata (*i.e.*, embracing ladies by fair or foul means) perish in the attempt to live as a sage. Again, the erring followers of other faiths go astray by way of anticipating other worlds, instead of establishing heaven on earth with the damsels.

Austerity (*tapas*), according to the Lokāyata, is to set right the displeasure of his beloved ones and to kneel down before them. *Mukti* or liberation is to have sex-relation with them after compromising their love quarrel. A *mukta* or a perfected one is who has unified his thought, word and deed on these affairs and succeeded in these ventures. The Lokāyata asks, 'what is the use of believing in the existence of liberation and getting physically reduced (due to austerities)?' None can be produced as a witness who has shown, seen or even heard of *mukti* or *vidu*. As it is impossible, then it would be wise to obey the orders of the king to enjoy the material comforts regularly through the acquired wealth and be contented with such easily available pleasures.

Thus in the foregoing lines Aruṇandi has presented the views of the Cārvāka and now he proceeds to refute them.

REFUTATION

Perception is Not the Only Pramāṇa

Aruṇandi questions the basic contention of the Lokāyata according to whom direct perception alone is the means for valid knowledge. How could Lokāyata claim that inference is invalid? If his father had died before his

birth and mother after his birth, how could he come to know the origin of his existence? In this case, it is only inference and not perception that has a vital role. Further, the mere sight of dark clouds, thunder and lightning will make one infer the ensuing heavy downpour; similarly the sight of the river which is in spate whose waves uproot sandal and eagle-wood (அகில்) trees, makes us conclude that there must have been heavy rains in the upper regions. Here too we depend on inferential knowledge.

If, according to the Lokāyata, inference itself involves perception (including our knowledge of previous direct perception-பூர்வகாட்சி), then it may be asked how can we determine the emergence of intelligence from the elements-constituted body? Moreover, intelligence which knows *sat* etc., through the senses is also understood in terms of inference. On the contrary, if the Lokāyata still insists on his basic proposition that other than perception there is no *pramāṇa*, then the Siddhāntin would reply that the fundamental principle of the Lokāyata that the body is constituted of the elements itself is based on inference only. For none can perceive the constituting elements in one's body.

Testimony

The *Vedas* and other scriptures being themselves free from blemish, reveal only faultless truths. For instance, the predictions of the astrologers are verified in due time. Moreover, the buried treasures beneath the earth are unearthed following the directions found in some texts.

Creator

"How could the Lokāyata claim that matter is eternal?" asks Aruṇandi. For, the products of matter have origin and decay and hence they are not only non-eternal but also require an agent to produce them like pots, etc., made out of clay require a potter. The Lokāyata says that mind etc., evolve from matter without a cause like the formation of bubbles in water. To this Aruṇandi objects

that the bubbles are formed not by themselves but by the agency of air. According to the Cārvāka, the bubbles formed out of water, resolves into water. Similarly the products of matter ultimately resolve in matter. The products of matter are not to be conscious like the intelligence since they are inert in nature. Again, if it is stated by the Cārvāka that intelligence evolves from the combination of the four elements like the red colour produced on chewing betel leaves, nuts and lime, then the red colour is inseparable from the matter itself. This argument is tenable in so far as the mind is inseparable and concomitant with the body. But in actual experience when the body becomes a corpse, the mind vanishes in a trice. Aruṇandi considers the argument of the Cārvāka that consciousness is a product of matter as preposterous and ridiculous. Matter and mind are two different entities and hence to hold that the latter arises from the former is unsound. The same argument is pursued further that in the combination of the leaves, nuts and lime only red colour results. On the contrary, by the union of different kinds of matter, senses, sensations and qualities result in different kinds and shades. How could the Lokāyata explain this phenomenon? He should admit an agent to cause material causation even as an agent is required to experience the red colour formed from the leaves etc.

Further, like the web coming out of the spider, the five senses, hunger, sleep, fear, passions are produced from the body and hence no first cause is needed according to the Lokāyata. If this is so, says Aruṇandi, then men should have been evolved from space as male, female and eunuch. Since the four elements are of the same quality, they cannot account for the existence of various beings such as animals, birds, plants, etc.

Karma

If the Lokāyata denies the role of *karma*, then differences in births cannot be accounted for. Eventually there

will be no bodies, *indriyas* and the knowledge produced from one to five senses.⁶ Moreover, the mere union of matter cannot produce the intellectual understanding, the effect of past actions and the differences in qualities. It is to be granted that *karma* alone is responsible for the lower and higher nature of *indriyas* and other differences in qualities (குணபேதங்கள்) as well as for the classes (சாதி-பேதங்கள்).

Mind

To the contention of the Lokāyata that the elements bring forth mind,⁷ Aruṇandi replies that we do not observe the invisible mind in the visible matter, since the material bodies are only objects of our knowledge and do not constitute knowledge itself. In a dead body no knowledge is witnessed. The Lokāyata may argue that since the vital air (*prāṇa*) has left the body, there is no cognition. But Aruṇandi argues that knowledge does not arise in sleep though air has not moved away from the body. So it is to be understood that evolution of knowledge through the elements is impossible.

If the Lokāyata asserts that intelligence is a product of the body, then in the order of creation different beings ranging from ant to elephant should have different intelligence in proportion to the size of their body. On the contrary, elephants do have lesser intelligence than human beings whose bodies are smaller than elephants. Hence intelligence is not a quality of the body. To this criticism the Lokāyata may reply that (when the elements unite) intelligence preponderates while the material components are less gross; intelligence is less while the material components are more gross. That is, knowledge depends upon the magnitude of the constituting matter. In that case, the Siddhāntin argues, the bodies produced by matter should neither grow larger nor smaller, but should remain the same throughout. But in actual experience we see that in due course the larger bodies reduce themselves into

smaller ones and *vice-versa*. Since the bodies grow and decay with time, we can certainly hold that intelligence never evolves from the elements.

Even if we admit that the bodies come into existence due to the combination of elements, then they must be homogenous and not heterogenous. But the Lokāyata has to account for the differences in birth as male and female and even procreation is possible through them only. Aruṇandi says that the Lokāyata places only deluding arguments in support of his thesis while the truth remains that the body is produced due to one's *karma* which is controlled by an agent. Aruṇandi refers to God by the term '*Karthā*' (கர்த்தா). To this view the Lokāyata may reply that males and females come into being from the union of the elements like the production of pot etc., from clay. Aruṇandi objects to this by saying that the elements vary among themselves in their qualities. Even if it is granted that they combine themselves, has any one perceived the combination of water and fire? asks the author.

It would be extremely difficult to conceive the idea of sex relation between the male and female members, if the elements constitute the human bodies. The Lord who has no beginning has coupled with His spouse and opted for enjoyment. Consequently, the human beings follow the same practice. In order to explicate the pattern of human living as the union between male and female, the Lord and His consort have union, a model to family life.

It is quite obvious that when water is associated with sandal, it is cold and with fire, it is hot. The Lokāyata asks: what *karma* has water acquired to undergo such a change? So he eliminates the concept of *karma* from the purview of philosophy. The Siddhāntin argues that in this example it is understood that water has two-fold characteristics, viz., coolness and hotness. Similarly *karmas* affect the human beings in two ways and yield pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain are experienced not by inert matter

(*acetana*) but by conscious beings (*cetana*). The Lokāyata asserts that the sexual pleasure is natural and is not due to *karma*. In that case, the Siddhāntin asks, why does he feel pain in the absence of pleasure? The Lokāyata should realize that pleasure and pain are attributed to the active force of virtue and vice respectively of his *prārabdha karma*. Even *karma* does not by itself yield the fruits. God in His infinite love and grace controls and directs *karma*.

The Lokāyata objects to the view of the Siddhāntin that *karma*, soul, etc., are eternal and holds that none can unite them, including God. Aruṇandi replies that the three impurities, viz., *āṇava*, *māyā* and *karma*, the soul and Lord all are eternal. The *karmas* are performed by the souls and their fruits do not reach the doer by themselves. The bodies being eternally unintelligent, cannot unite with the soul by themselves. Hence the eternal Lord has to bring about the union between *karma* and its effect, *karma* and body and body and soul and govern the universe under an eternal law.

Soul

The Lokāyata denies the existence of the soul on the ground that it is imperceptible to the external senses. The Siddhāntin asks him whether the body can look at the eyes which see it? It is but natural for the eyes to behold the body. But the eyes cannot perceive the soul. Since the soul is of the form of consciousness (*cetana*), it can perceive the *karaṇas* or the instruments of knowledge. Even as the body cannot see the eyes, the *karaṇas* too cannot see the soul. So the Lokāyata should know the reality of the soul. Further, fire appears only in combustible objects and by itself it does not become apparent. Similarly, the soul does not appear apart from the body. A lamp burns with the aids of oil and wick and in the same way the soul experiences *karmas* attached to the body.

According to Aruṇandi, as knowledge, which appears and disappears, is different from the body, the knowledge

of the past life must be continued in the present also instead of ignorance. If the Cārvāka objects to this view, then while dreaming is it possible to think that it is a dream? Certainly it is not so. Nevertheless, the knowledge of the post-natal stage is not the same as the pre-natal stage. Since knowledge arises and disappears, it cannot be attributed as an essential nature of the soul. The soul transcends such empirical conditions of knowledge and hence it is pure.

If the Lokāyata objects to the view that the knowledge that has lapsed is reproduced again, then, how can we explain the phenomenon that while in sleep one is unconscious and in waking state one is conscious? To the question how does one body perish and another one emerge, it is replied by the Siddhāntin that it is like the soul in sleep losing its entire consciousness of the body and regaining it in waking state. Again, the Lokāyata asks how the *indriyas* come into being when they are destroyed in death. Aruṇādi replies that it is like the motionless state of one's *karaṇas* in swoon (the *karaṇas* subsist in vital air in swoon) and when one recovers, the *karaṇas* get activated. The wise people compare births and deaths to the waning and waxing of the moon.

The elements spoken of by the Lokāyata will exist so long as they are experienced and then they will disappear in due course. Hence it becomes necessary to hold that an Omnipotent Being creates, sustains and withdraws the elements. Even as the inanimate clay is converted into a pot due to an efficient cause like a potter, the unconscious elements are made active due to an intelligent agent, *viz.*, God.

Lord Śiva, the Supreme Being, is seldom known to Brahmā, Viṣṇu and even to the four *Vedas*. As an arbiter, He walked in the streets of Thiruvārūr at midnight to redress the love-quarrel between His devotees — St. Sundarar and his spouse Paravaiyār. This attitude of Śiva shows His benevolent nature towards His devotees. If the Lokāyata

surrenders to Lord Śiva and aspires for His grace, the Lord will bless him in a trice.

Aruṇandi now proceeds to state the impurities of materialistic pleasures, especially due to the company of women and stresses the need to develop devotion to Lord Śiva. He says that when a golden ornament is dropped in dirt, we hesitate to touch it with our hands. Likewise, infatuation for womankind should be rooted out on the ground that their bodies too contain urine, blood, excreta, etc., that stink. There is no meaning in chasing women. One should give up lust. For, the bodies of women are only a mass of dirt which are composed of skin, blood, flesh, fat, bones and secretions along with the nauseating worms, phlegm, bile, etc., which make their bodies swaying vessels of urine. Still women are praised for their fish-like eyes. Aruṇandi emphasises that devotion to the Lord should not be hampered by the mean mentality of chasing women and indulging in sexual relations. From the above, it is to be understood that sex is to be sublimated and not vulgarised. It is to be condemned with relentless severity since the bodies of women are only a mass of dirt.

Aruṇandi compares the lustful wandering of men to the rambling movements of pigs which eat human excreta and become besmeared with it and enjoy it. Overcoming this degrading tendency *viz.*, lust, if one becomes devoted to the Lord Supreme, one can enjoy His unspotted and perennial bliss. This enjoyment alone can be rewarding with multitude of joy and one may feel free from the impurities. It is quite natural that the enraged men never know the benefits of forbearance; people wallowing in passion do not relish the pleasures of being passionless. Similarly the Lokāyata is one who has developed passions towards womenfolk and who opts for momentary pleasures ignoring supreme bliss. If he has to realize this, he should relinquish his lower natures and cling fast to the Holy Feet of the Lord who is Parāparan (the transcendent and immanent Lord) and who has been praised by Indra and other celestials,

Brahmā, Viṣṇu and others. Truly, the Lokāyata, assures Aruṇandi, can experience in his body the unsurpassable bliss.

The Lokāyata considers lust, anger, greediness and other vices as pleasure. This is like preferring heat in winter and cold water in summer which are not durable but end with the season. Instead, if the Lokāyata follows the path of *jñāna* and submits himself totally to the Lord, then he can enjoy everlasting bliss.

Aruṇandi concludes the discussion by saying that the works to be widely read and reflected over by the followers of Śaivism are the *Śivāgamas*. The revelations of the *Śivāgamas* are *Paṭi*, *Paśu* and *Pāśa*. The thing to be done for ever is to meditate on and adore the Holy Feet of the Lord. The things to be abhorred and abandoned are lust, jealousy, etc. The thing which is required is the Lord's grace in abundance. Liberation (*mukti*) is attained by removing the stains of the three impurities and uniting the soul with the Pure Lord.

EVALUATION

Aruṇandi calls this materialistic school of thought Lokāyata and in no place does he mention its other name, viz., Cārvāka. Strictly speaking, the *Lokāyata-sāstra* is attributed to Brahaspati or Cārvāka. It is very difficult to determine who this Brahaspati was. Dasgupta refers to a number of works wherein the name occurs. In his words, "Brahaspati, the author of the Lokāyata-sāstra is thus a mythical figure, and we have practically no information regarding the originator of the Lokāyata system. It is probable that the original Lokāyata work was written in the form of sutras which had atleast two commentaries, the earliest of which was probably as early as 300 or 400 B. C. There was at least one metrical version of the main contents of this system from which extracts are found quoted in Mādhva's *Śarvadarśana Saṁgraha* and in other places." Similar is the case with Cārvāka whether it was the name

of a real person or not. The term Lokāyata refers to tricky disputation, sophistry or causistry,¹⁰ while Cārvāka refers to a kind of people who are fond of eating since Cārvāka has its root *cārv* which means to eat.¹¹ Aruṇandi also has not mentioned the sources from which he has gleaned the basic doctrines of this system. For, "the original works of Cārvāka school are now lost to us. Some fragments of views and utterances which are lying scattered in different works of the Hindus, Buddhists and Jains form the basis of our knowledge of the system."¹²

Aruṇandi commences his work on Lokāyata by saying that Brahaspati was the priest of Indra. When Indra wanted to do penance, Brahaspati preached him the attractions of earthly pleasures and persuaded him not to resort to *tapas*, but to resume his usual life. The followers of Brahaspati, setting aside the purpose for which the preachings were meant, despised everything else, and indulged in self-seeking pleasures and sensuous enjoyments. They even went to the extent of justifying them as worth pursuing. Just as Lord Krishna induced Arjuna to kill his enemies (kith and kin), Brahaspati convinced Indra to perform his *svadharma*. It is a pity that Brahaspati's followers went to extremes in following his teachings. Hence Aruṇandi rebukes them saying that they have neither the intelligence nor the grace to understand the teachings of their master.

Lokāyata has been explained as a philosophical system which has a series of conclusions drawn from false premises. Of course, the first premise that perception alone is valid is inadequate. Epistemologically, the system fails to recognise the validity of inference and testimony and hence its metaphysics is based on shaky foundations. The author of the *Parvadarśanasamgraha* says that there are two kinds of perceptions, *viz.*, external and internal (*i.e.*, as produced by the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind).¹³ But Aruṇandi holds that perception according to the Lokāyata

is of six kinds. Tattvaparakāsar, the commentator of *Siddhiyār Parapakkam* lists them. In another place also while refuting the existence of the soul, the Lokāyata mentions about the six kinds of perceptions that if the soul exists, it must be given to any one of these kinds of perception. But hardly one can find references to such accounts in the epistemology of any system in Indian Philosophy. All the schools invariably assert that the Lokāyata accepts only perception as the valid means of knowledge. Again, the arguments of Aruṇandi to show the non-acceptability of inference, testimony and other *pramāṇas* are not well explained.

The Lokāyata, according to Aruṇandi, quotes the Vedic authority to establish his point of view, *viz.*, 'the elements evolve into food, and from food arises body, and from the body mind and the rest and resolve into each other in the same order.' In the *Brahadāranyaka Upaniṣad* it is stated that consciousness emerges from elements of matter and ceases along with them and that after death there is no consciousness. In order to substantiate his standpoint, the Lokāyata receives support from the *Upaniṣads*, the end of the *Vedas*. It may be questioned that when the Lokāyata defies the authority of the *Vedas*, how can he quote the scripture to defend his position? According to the Lokāyata, "... the *Veda* is tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-contradiction, and tautology; then again the imposters who call themselves vaidic pundits are mutually destructive as the authority of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa*, is overthrown by those who maintain that of the *karma-kāṇḍa* while those who maintain the authority of the *jñāna-kāṇḍa* reject that of the *karma-kāṇḍa*, and lastly, the three *Vedas* themselves are only the incoherent rhapsodies of knaves."¹³

The Lokāyata denies verbal testimony as the valid means of knowledge and he violates his epistemological stand when he resorts to Vedic authority to strengthen his standpoint. Probably, he might have understood the whole

text in the sense of materialism and the trouble starts here only.

While refuting the Lokāyata, the author makes use of *pūrvāvat* and *seṣāvat* kinds of *anumāna*, viz., when we expect rain while seeing the dark nimbus clouds, we have a case for the former and when we see a river in floods and we infer that there was rain elsewhere, we have a case for the latter. The author's knowledge of Nyāya system is revealed. This makes one wonder why he has not included Nyāya system into the list of schools which he has considered in his work. In the *Supakkam* also Aruṇandi refutes the metaphysical doctrine of the Cārvāka without mentioning its name. Only the commentators refer to this school. According to the Siddhāntin, the preservation of the world is real even as creation and destruction are real. The Lokāyata upholds the view that by means of perception the existence of the world is ascertained. The same *pramāṇa*, viz., perception is sufficient to substantiate the origin and decay of the world according to the Siddhāntin.¹⁶

J.M. Nallaswamy Pillai translates a verse thus: "If you say that the five senses, hunger, sleep, fear and passions are produced from the body, without any other first cause, like the web from the spider, then why don't you produce the web from the sky?"¹⁷ This translation seems to be misleading. For Aruṇandi says that, according to the Lokāyata, the web is a new creation from the spider (*asatkūryavūda* or *ārambavūda*) and like this if the five senses etc., are newly emanated from the body, then men as male, female and eunuch should have been produced from space. The interpretation of the words உலூதை போல் (like the spider) and 'வானின் வந்திடும்' (will come from the space) makes the translator hold his view while the commentator links the words 'வானின் வந்திடும்' with the subsequent words 'மாதர், ஆண், அலி. ...' The translator has not included the ideas of male, female and eunuch which is found included in the text. The thought which is implicitly stated by the Siddh-

āntin is that subjective characteristics of human beings cannot be the products of body, but of the soul.

If the Lokāyata claims that the elements are the cause of body, then how are we to account for the sexual contacts between male and female? Taking into account of the scriptural evidences, Aruṇandi holds that the union of Śiva and Śakti paved the way for the living beings to follow sexual relations. In the *Supakkam* also he says, "Śiva begets Śakti and Śakti begets Śiva. Both in their happy union produce the worlds and the jīvas. Still, Bhavan (Śiva) is a celibate (Brahmacāri) and the sweet tongued Śakti remains a virgin. Sages only comprehend this secret."¹⁸ Is it a fact that the human beings follow the example of Divine Beings in sexual matters? one may ask seriously. For human beings have psychological urge or natural instinct in them to have sexual experience for procreation. Gods and Goddesses get united for the sake of creating this universe etc., which may be conveniently said as the divine sport (*līla*). This explanation does not resolve the difficulty as to why the Gods and Goddesses should have sex relations.

Other schools of Indian philosophy vehemently attack Cārvāka for obvious reasons. First, it does not approve the authority of the *Vedas* and secondly, it does not recognise and appreciate all the cardinal virtues or human values (*puṇyārthas*). The Lokāyata attaches exclusive importance to *kāma*. This system has not been criticised for its being atheistic. For we have Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsa systems which advocate atheism. Aruṇandi refutes this system for its nonpostulation of a Supreme God, which is revealed in many verses. Also he condemns severely the voluptuous attitude promulgated by the followers of Cārvāka which would be detrimental to the human development through religious means. The last verse of this section is significant in the sense that the author summarises the quintessence of Śaiva Siddhānta philosophy in a nutshell which will enable the readers to proceed to the other schools the author has to consider.

Lokāyata (Cārvāka) School

Owing to their great zeal to get away with the ecclesiastical monopoly and total freedom from religious bindings, the materialists went to the other extreme.¹ In the words of Prof. Hiriyanna, "It is difficult to believe that there could ever have existed such a school of thought. Even if we explain its extreme views as due to a reaction against free speculations and the austere asceticism that were widely current in ancient India, the system, we must admit, should once have inculcated less objectionable principles. The form in which it is now presented has an air of unreality about it. If any proof were required, it is found in its lesson of self-indulgence, which needs not to be taught. It is also some what suspicious that the Cārvāka doctrine should consist, so much in denying what is accepted by the other schools and so little in contributing any new ideas of its own to the sum of Indian thought."²

Though the Lokāyata system has been presented and evaluated as crude materialism, Aruṇandi tries to picturise it not as a system to be stunned with. It has certain values worthy of consideration as well. For instance, according to Aruṇandi, though the Lokāyata system has set aside the feasibility of attaining liberation, it makes an earnest appeal to the people to obey the orders of the rulers and enjoy material comforts not through unfair means, but through the acquired wealth. The trends of patriotism and perfect acquisition of property show the Lokāyata's adherence to social norms.

3

BUDDHISM

Introduction

Buddha preached a religious philosophy which was not dogmatic, but he discountenanced any metaphysical speculation. He followed critical analysis based on observation and reasoning. As the Buddha was rational in his contemplation on all the spheres of human existence, a philosophical system was incidentally formed. "His Philosophy, partly expressed and partly implicit, may be called positivisim in so far as he taught that our thoughts should be confined to this world and to the improvement of our existence here. It may be called phenomenalism in so far as he taught that we were sure only of the phenomena we experienced. It is therefore, a kind of empiricism in method because experience according to him, was the source of knowledge." But Buddha did not want his teachings to be styled as any 'ism'. He developed psychology, logic and ethics, but did not favour metaphysics for 'great truths were hidden away in the fogs of mysty metaphysics.'

After the passing away of the Buddha, his followers began to justify his teachings, to defend them from criticism to convert other thinkers to their faith and ask metaphysical questions concerning things beyond our experience, which the Buddha was reluctant to discuss. According to Radhakrishnan, "The empiricism of Buddha led to a thorough criticism and disintegration of conventional beliefs. The empiricism of the Buddhist schools is an intel-

ligent application of the critical method to experience itself. Through the pressure of logic rather than of set design Buddhism resulted in different schools of thought.” The author of the *Sarva Darśana Saṁgraha* says that “these same Buddhas discuss the highest end of man from four stand-points. Celebrated under the designations of Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāshika, these Buddhists adopt respectively the doctrine of a universal void (nihilism), an external void (subjective idealism), the inferrability of external objects (representationism), and the perceptibility of external objects (presentationism). Though the venerated Buddha be the only one teacher (his disciples) are fourfold in consequence of this diversity of views; Just as when one has said, “The sun has set,” the adulterer, the thief, the divinity student, and others understand that it is time to set about their assignations, their theft, their religious duties, and so forth, according to their several inclinations.”

Thus among the several schools in Buddhism, only four have been prominent and recognised by the Hindu thinkers and they are as follows:

1. Mādhyamika or Śūnyavāda (nihilism)
2. Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda (subjective idealism)
3. Sautrāntika or Bāhyānumeya vāda (representative or critical realism), and
4. Vaibhāshika or Bāhyapratyakṣavāda (direct realism).

Of these, the first two schools belong to the Mahāyāna school of Buddhism while the rest belong to the Hīnayāna. “When the Hindu writers refer to the Buddhist doctrine in general terms such as “the Buddhist say” without calling them as Vijñānavādins or the Yogācāras and the Śūnyavādins, they often refer to the Sarvāstivādins by which they mean both the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāshikas, ignoring the difference that exists between these two schools. It is well to mention that there is hardly any evidence to prove

that the Hindu writers were acquainted with the Theravāda doctrines as expressed in the Pāli works.”

The Sanskrit counterpart of the philosophical system of Sthaviravāda (Theravāda in Pāli which means the ‘doctrines of the elders’) is Sarvāstivāda. This view holds that all (*sarva*) exists in the past, present, and future. This school consists of several sub-schools associated with Theravāda. The followers of Sarvāstivāda took as their authority the *Abhidhamma* texts. The commentaries on the above texts came to be called *vibhāṣas*. A section of the Sarvāstivādins in Kashmir following the *vibhāṣas* has been called Vaibhāṣika. From this school gradually emerged another branch in the name of Sautrāntika which was more critical than the other schools in outlook to the problems of philosophy.

(A) SAUTRĀNTIKA SCHOOL

Aruṇandi takes up the Sautrāntika school for consideration. Repeatedly he calls the followers of this school as ‘the Buddhas’ and examines the doctrines of this school in a number of verses and the other schools in one or two verses.

Aruṇandi himself gives the reasons for considering the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism first. The Buddhists deny the Vedic authority and its principles like *dharma* etc., but follow the *dharma* as set forth in the *Piṭaka* works; they have five virtues⁶ to practise; they wear the red vesture and worship the Bothi tree. Among the four schools of Buddhism, the Sautrāntika school is given priority since its followers do not adhere to caste distinctions. According to this school, the Buddha (the great ascetic) is the Supreme Lord who has become omniscient. He has warded off the major sins such as lie, murder, robbery, intoxication, lust, etc., on earth and out of spotless mercy he had taken on himself the woes of others. For the benefit of the human beings he has composed the *Āgamic* texts in the name of *Piṭakas* which have been even praised by the celestials.

The *Piṭakas* accept perception and inference as the means for knowledge. Perception and inference involve subject and object of knowledge which undergo change from moment to moment. The *jñāna* and *jñeya* i.e., knowledge and the object of knowledge divide themselves into *rūpa* (form), *arūpa* (formless), *Vīdu* (*nirvāṇa* or emancipation) and *valakku* (belief or convention). Each one of these divides itself into two resulting in eight principles.

The nature of form (*rūpa*) is of two kinds:

- (i) *Bhūtarūpa* (material form, *acaitanya*) and
- (ii) *Upādānarūpa* (sensory form, *caitanya*)

The nature of formless (*arūpa*) has

- (i) *Chittam* (mind) and
- (ii) *Karma* (fruits of action)

The nature of emancipation (*vīdu*) consists of

- (i) *Kurram* (fault) and
- (ii) *Skandha* (the constituent elements of the Being)

The nature of belief (*valakku*) has

- (i) Truth and
- (ii) falsity.

The *bhūtarūpa* contains earth, water, fire and air; the *upādāna rūpa* contains hardness, taste, smell, and colour. When all these eight combine, we get forms which are visible in nature. *Chittam* (mind or intellect) perceives sensations through the senses; *Kāma* is responsible for the analysis of good and bad by the mind. Attainment of *vīdu* (emancipation) after the annihilation of passion etc., is known as emancipation from faults (குற்றவீடு). *Skandha vīdu* i.e., emancipation from *skandhas* is attained when one subdues totally the influence of the five *skandhas*. The two beliefs viz., right and wrong are divided each into aggrega-

tion (தொகை), succession (தொடர்ச்சி) and annihilation (மிகுத்துரை). Totally we have six kinds of beliefs known as

- (i) Right belief of aggregation (தொகையுண்மை வழக்கு)
- (ii) Wrong belief of aggregation (தொகையின்மை வழக்கு)
- (iii) Right belief of succession (தொடர்ச்சியுண்மை வழக்கு)
- (iv) Wrong belief of succession (தொடர்ச்சியின்மை வழக்கு)
- (v) Right belief of annihilation (மிகுத்துரையுண்மை வழக்கு)
- (vi) Wrong belief of annihilation (மிகுத்துரையின்மை வழக்கு)

Now the Buddhists proceed to explain each one of the above stated belief. When a man is simply called as mere aggregate of the five *skandhas*, then we have right belief of aggregation. Wrong belief of aggregation arises when one is different from the aggregate of the five *skandhas*. The right belief of succession consists in the continuation of cause and effect, free from the delusion of the three dimensions of time such as past, present and future. To say that a soul or a thing as the continuation of cause and effect exists for ever, is the wrong belief of succession. Right belief of annihilation is to hold that all the existing things are bound to perish. Wrong belief of annihilation is to hold that the objects do not perish, but exist at the causal level.

Further, to right belief and wrong belief have been added four other kinds of beliefs such as

- (i) Right belief associated with truth (உள்ளது சார்ந்த உள் வழக்கு)
- (ii) Wrong belief associated with truth (உள்ளது சார்ந்த இல் வழக்கு)

- (iii) Right belief associated with falsity (இல்லது சார்ந்த உள்வழக்கு)
- (iv) Wrong belief associated with falsity (இல்லது சார்ந்த இல்லவழக்கு)

Among these, right belief refers to the assertion of the existing fact like the assertion that elephants have tusks. On the contrary, to say that hares have tusks is wrong belief. Further, to say that knowledge is born from mere contact is right belief associated with truth. To hold that, if knowledge perishes, no fresh one arises in its place, is wrong belief associated with truth. To hold that previously there was no knowledge, but arises afterwards is right belief associated with falsity. To say that hair grows on the plam and there is a rope made out of it is wrong belief associated with falsity.

The Sautrāntikas further argue that other than the aforesaid four postulates (such as form, formless, liberation and belief) and their expansion, people wrongly recognise space, time, soul, several cardinal points and a Lord who transcends our intellectual comprehension as true and permanent. In fact, they are all impermanent and momentary.

The arguments placed against the existence of space are as follows:

- (i) Space is not suitable for human inhabitations.
- (ii) Even if it is asserted that space is the support for products of the four elements, it cannot be so, as space is formless.
- (iii) If space is accepted since it is the cause of sound, it may be argued that sound cannot be produced apart from the extended bodies with form.
- (iv) If space is accepted as being present everywhere inseparably, no such space can be conceived of.

Soul

If the human soul is said to possess knowledge, then why should we pursue knowledge through the senses, sensations and scriptures? It may be argued that the soul unites with the *indriyas*, associates with the sensations and studies the scriptures, for acquiring knowledge. The Sautrāntikas would argue that in that case, why a man is left with doubt to determine the colour to be red or green in darkness? Moreover, the soul knows nothing in the absence of the senses. Since the senses are not intelligent, the soul understands in union with the senses. To this contention, it is argued by the Buddhists that if the soul knows through the senses, the knowledge known through the five senses must be given to one sense itself. On the contrary, if it is argued that the soul cognises everything in collaboration with the senses, then such a view is akin to the Buddhists' view. Those who favour relativistic approach to knowledge unconsciously enter into the opponent's camp *i.e.*, Buddhism.

If, in addition to knowledge (*jñāna*) and the object of knowledge (*jñēya*), a knower (*jñātr*) is postulated, then Buddhists ask: is that knower sentient or insentient? If insentient, then the knower is equated with earth (*acetana*). If sentient, *i.e.*, the knower is knowledge itself, then it is like saying that dhol rice has dhol for its curry. Here it is to be understood that when *jñāna* itself stands for knowledge, it is unwarranted, according to the Sautrāntikas, to postulate separately the *jñātru* as having knowledge. When dhol rice has a distinct name, it is a fallacy of repetition to consider the dhol rice for its curry also.

If the soul is formless (*arūpa*), then it is seldom attached to a body which has a definite form. If it has a form (*rūpa*), then it cannot be contained in another body. If it is an atom (*anu*), it cannot be sustained in the body, but will pass away through many of the holes. Hence the soul is not atomic. If it is eternal (*nittam*), then consciousness has neither appearance nor disappearance. But consciousness has

both appearance and disappearance and hence the soul is not eternal. It is also claimed that the soul is omnipresent. It cannot be so since there are bodily differences and our knowledge does not extend everywhere. If one soul pervades the whole body, then when the body decomposes, the soul also should perish along with the body. Again, if the soul is located in any part of the body as a knower, then other than its place of existence, it cannot know the other parts of the body.

Time

The calculated time operates in a three-fold way *viz.*, creation, preservation and destruction of things. In that case, time will get confused with the objects in connection with the three dimensions in time. Hence when the objects perish, time also should cease to exist. Only the objects have three modes of existence, not time. To assert that there are three kinds of time is a clear case for wrong belief.

Space

When 'A' is to the east of 'B', then 'B' is to the west of 'A'. But to one west of 'A', it is the east. Now the puzzle arises which is the actual direction for 'A', whether the east or the west? The belief in cardinal points is false, according to the Sautrāntika.

Creator

The theists maintain that the world has been created by God. To say that the world exists already and God creates subsequently is self-contradiction according to the Buddhists. Again, what is existing already need not have been created. If the world does not exist, it can never be created by God. If creation means creating the effect from its cause, *i.e.*, God as a cause creates the world as an effect, then the world must have both existence and non-existence. If it is argued by the non-Buddhists that just as the potter has produced pot, etc., from clay, God has crea-

ted the world, then the following objection is raised: Wherefrom did God create the world? If from the world itself, then it is understood that even before God, the world existed. On the contrary, if it is said that God has created the world as an omnipresent Being existing everywhere, then, the Sautrāntika holds that 'everywhere' exists first and has given the idea of God afterwards. Again, the theists claim that God has created the world out of nothing, but out of His bounteous grace. But how do we justify His grace when creating the death-dealing monsters like lions, tigers, elephants and the god of death? If God has created the world to show His might and powers, then better would it be to worship a lunatic, contends the Sautrāntika.

Creation

The question remains: What is the purpose behind creation? If it is stated by the theists that it is the sport (*līlā*) of God, then such a God is only a playful child with meagre wisdom. If *karma* necessitated creation, then the performers of *karma* must have existed prior to creation. This idea is to be genuinely pursued *i.e.*, the world has no beginning, but eternal. If God has a form, then someone might have created that form. In that case, the creator of that form is superior to God in existence and power. If the form is due to His will, then the Sautrāntika argues that all beings on earth can take forms out of their will. If *karma* is the cause for everybody's form, then all have forms because of *karma* only. If God has no form (*arūpam*), like space, never can He bring ashore the masses drowning in the ocean of births and deaths. If the theists hold that God is regarded as a shade for everyone who seeks shelter, then the shade too can help those who go near to it. Similarly, God extends His benefits to those who are near Him and He is not all pervading. If God is said to be omniscient though not all-pervading, then the Santrāntika argues that a form is inevitable which is to be known through

devotion and contemplation. And without form, no knowledge could exist.

The *Vedāgamas* which are eternal, eulogise the existence of God. But it is ridiculous to hold that the *Vedāgamas* come into existence without the author. If the theists hold that God is known through the *Vedāgamas* and the *Vedāgamas* through God, then to the Sautrāntika it is highly astounding. Again, the vegetable kingdom like tree etc., has no life or intelligence, since they grow and perish and again grow like thicksand, hair and horn, but essentially have forms by means of the elements. The reason for such a state of affairs is due to the consideration that the vegetables subserve the needs of other lives like *andasam*, *svedasam* and *sarayujam*, and exist eternally.

According to the Sautrāntika, to take away a life is not proper. But one can eat the flesh already slaughtered by others, since the dead body becomes a corpse like the earth. This cannot be considered as a sin. It is questioned, whether the merits reach a person who organises a water *pandal* with fragrant water or one who actually drinks the water? It goes to the former. Similarly, the sin goes to the butcher and not to the eater. The five *skandhas* viz., *rūpa*, *vedāna*, *saṃjñā*, *bhāvana* and *viññāna* cause bondage and suffering and it is wrong belief to hold that they are not annihilated but are reduced to their cause. When they are annihilated, blissful emancipation is certain and this is right belief. To get rid of the qualities like *kāma*, *krodha*, *lobha*, *moha*, *mata*, and *mārcarya* which destroy human integration, to stick on to righteous deeds, to destroy the afflicting desires of the senses, to subdue pleasure and pain, to practise the balanced and faultless life in eightfold ways,^s and to give up evil doings are the means to attain the quality of wisdom (*jñāna-sīlam*) which in turn culminates in the imperishable *samādhi* or *nirvāṇa*.

REFUTATION

Aruṇaṇḍi refutes the Sautrāntika by saying that ignorantly the Sautrāntika Buddhists claim that their Lord

Buddha has realized everything. For, rarely can one realize the immeasurable universe and if it is said that the Buddha has realized one by one, then the universe should be measurable. If he knew it due to his limitless wisdom, then his wisdom is not so capable and he could not know everything, because intelligence is momentary and will disappear no sooner than it appears and hence it is not omniscient. Moreover, the Buddhists argue that Lord Buddha knows everything after knowing a few things and contemplates in the same direction. The Siddhāntin replies that the objects of knowledge are manifold and one divides itself into a number of parts and how does one know the many from the one? While cognizing an object, one should have clarity by means of comprehensive investigation. As we do not retain the consciousness of each previous moment, it is not possible to have omniscient wisdom by knowing a few things.

If it is claimed that Lord Buddha has revealed his *dharma* etc., after attaining liberation, it implies that he has annihilated the five *skandhas*. But his speech after *mukti* is like the act of a person who died after consuming honey and ghee, but born again to proclaim that the combination of honey and ghee is dangerous. Here Aruṇandi tries to show that the Buddha had not attained liberation and hence his revelations need not be viewed seriously. If the Buddha had preached *dharma* etc., and then had attained *nirvāṇa*, then Aruṇandi holds that the Buddha knew nothing about *mukti*. Hence his abstruse moral sermons cannot lead one towards perfection. The prophetic utterances of the Buddha are like the attempt of a person who intends to bring ashore his fellowmen by crossing the river, without knowing that the river is in spate.

Instead of affirming that a Supreme Being redeems human beings by enlivening them like the inseparable nature of water and its taste, the Buddha undergoes the fiery ordeal of miserable birth and liberates himself to redress the agonies of his fellowmen. This is like the attitude

of a deer, which having witnessed its kind being caught in the toils of the hunter's net attempts to save them, but is itself caught in the process. Aruṇandi holds that none can equal the Buddha who has shown the pathway to hell, but claims that it is the genuine path for redemption. If the Buddha was born to establish *dharma* etc., then every human being is born to propound *dharma*.

The Buddhists argue that their Lord entered into an endless number of wombs for the propagation of *dharma*. But such births are caused by *karma* only. The Buddhists deny this and say that Lord Buddha has taken several births out of his will to fulfil his mission *i.e.*, to preach *dharma*. But the Siddhāntin argues that every one born on this earth should have the same motive to preach *dharma*. Unlike others being born through the wombs, the Buddha was born by tearing off his mother's belly. The Siddhāntin is not prepared to accept the *dharma* envisaged by one who killed his own mother.

The Buddhists claim that their Master had taken several births and in all of them he preached *dharma* and abhorred evils like murder, etc. The Siddhāntin refutes this claim by saying that amidst his various births, he must have incarnated as lion, jackal, tiger, etc., and killed men and animals to appease his hunger. In that case, Aruṇandi asks: did he not violate the *dharma*? If not so, did he appease then his hunger by eating straw? To the Buddhists their master was the sufferer of others' suffering (பரதுக்க துக்கன்). But his gracious gestures shown towards a woman who deserts her husband and indulges in prostitution and towards a hunter who kills birds by means of a noose are not commendable. According to Aruṇandi, it is difficult for the Buddhists to have any authoritative text since before one could find out an idea and then find out words for the same and meaning, one's consciousness, not lasting for more than a moment, would have passed away. If the Buddhists deny this and state that the treatise is a series of ideas (சந்தரான வழி), then the same letters should

be repeated again. On the contrary, if the Buddhists say that the succeeding intelligence is superior to the preceeding one, then the latter knowledge, being momentary in essence and characters, becomes the text of the previous knowledge. Hence the works of the Buddhists are the utterances of mad men. A good book is one which is devoid of inconsistencies either in the beginning or in the middle or in the end. The question remains that since the Buddhists' treatises are not consistent throughout, to which category can the works of the Buddhists be included?

The Buddhists hold that in the beginning their master had performed virtuous deeds abundantly and as an omniscient being, out of grace towards the fellow beings, he had contributed the *Piṭaka* texts mainly to show the path of righteousness which, in turn, will lead one to redemption. It is questioned: who revealed virtues to the Buddha? Like the Buddha, if his perceptor told him, then who was his perceptor? The answer to this leads to *ad infinitum*. Since, therefore, the scripture of the Buddhists cannot have a source or an author and since the present Buddha also could not have known the truth, he is not worthy of worship. Then who is it that the Buddhists worship in their shrines?

If, according to the Sautrāntika Buddhists, the author of the *Piṭaka* texts is in the shrine (*viz.*, the Buddha) then who is the perceptor adored by him, where does he dwell and what are his works? While such factors are hitherto unknown, the Buddha has no *Gurusantānam* (lineage of perceptrs). According to Aruṇandi, the texts of grandeur are only the sacred utterances of the immortal God, Paramesvara who revealed the sacred truth during dissolution (*samhāra*). Such texts are known as *Vedas* and *Āgamas*. The followers of these texts insist on the controlling of passions and discipline of food habits. But Aruṇandi contemptuously holds that the *Piṭaka* texts are given by a glutton who eats meat with his unwashed face before sunrise.

There are three kinds of textual authority according to Aruṇāndi such as:

- (i) primary work (முதல் நூல்)
- (ii) secondary work (வழி நூல்)
- (iii) dependent work (சார்பு நூல்)

The contention of the Siddhāntin is that the works of the Buddha do not come under any one of these categories. And it is a great wonder to preach *dharma* without appropriate sacred texts.

The Siddhāntin wants to know from the Buddhists: Whom do they adore when their Master had attained perfection? If the Buddhists argue that the ceremonies performed towards the dead ones yield benefits to the performer and others, then they have to accept the eternity of the souls. Also, there must be a Supreme person to grant such benefits. But the Buddhists accept neither. The ceremonies offered to the dead persons in Buddhism resemble the act of supplying ghee and wick to a lamp that has been put out.

“Even as an author is known by inference from the study of his book, we know the contents of a book through inference,” say the Buddhists. The Siddhāntin asks: how does the knowledge of hell and heaven get ascertained in the absence of sacred texts? If their existence is known by inference alone, let the Buddhists disclose it. But the sacred texts give the information about the existence of hell and heaven. They reveal the subject matter which are seldom known through perception or inference. If the Buddhists deny the authority of testimony, then the *Pitakas* too will lose their authority and will cease to be scripture.

The Buddhists maintain that everything is impermanent (*anittam*). Aruṇāndi asks whether *anittam* refers to beings or non-beings or beings-non beings? If impermanency is postulated to the non-beings, then non-beings

never exist and hence nothing comes out of nothing. If *anittam* points to the beings, then whatever exists can never become non-existent, but should exist for ever. If it points to the beings — non-beings, then existing beings cannot become non-existent and *vice-versa*. The Buddhists may ask others to show a permanent thing among the beings. It is shown that the human body (*stūla śarīra*) comes into being, exists for sometime and perishes, while the subtle body (*sūkṣmā śarīra*) is not impermanent.

Again, the Buddhists say “the sprout appears on the destruction of the seed ; similarly the forms of all things appear from their causes, *i.e.*, the things are permanent and appear from their causes and are reborn by mere change of form.” If so, the Buddhists had forgotten their own postulate of impermanence (*anittam*) and adopted permanence and also embraced the Jaina doctrine of *syādvāda* (*asti-nāsti*—a thing, relatively exists and does not exist). If the Buddhists claim that the Siddhāntin has misunderstood them and explain that what appeared as sprout, leaves and tree are not permanent, disappear as soon as they appear, then the Buddhists could grant that the youth (*bāla*), maturity (*taruṇa*) and old age (*vrddha*) of the body are the modal changes of the permanent soul. Aruṇandi holds that which is destroyed is not the subtle body (*sūkṣma śarīra*) but the gross body (*stūla śarīra*) *i.e.*, while change takes place, the subtle body remains while the gross body is annihilated.

If the Buddhists claim that the bodies are constituted by the combination of elements, then the difficulty arises that they cannot unite into a body since they are opposed to each other. On the contrary, if they argue that bodies are formed due to the inter course between a male and a female, then how are we to account for the existence of worms inside the trunk of a tree and toad in the rock? The Buddhists again may argue that the bodies come into existence due to bad *karma* and good *karma*. But these two cannot mingle and form bodies since they exclude each

other. If food is the cause, then food which is responsible for growth in youth should not allow the body to decay in the old age (*vruddhāvastha*). If it is said that the bodies are formed by intelligence (*caitanya*), then the formless intelligence cannot assume non-intelligent (*acaitanya*) form of the body. If nothingness constitutes the bodies, then the bodies will be non-existent like the sky flower. Further, the Buddhists hold that the non-existent things can be manifested as existent things like the evolution of a tree from a seed. Aruṇandi refutes this analogy by saying that the tree grows from the seed and not from nothingness. Every seed potentially contains the essence of the tree and hence the tree sprouts from the seed. Otherwise, the paddy seeds may grow into palm trees. Again, no tree comes out of a tree and what is non-existent cannot be created. The seed acts as the cause while the tree is the effect. Have the Buddhists forgotten their own view that the five *skandhas* (the cause) constitute the bodies (effects) as the moon is formed by beams of light? asks Aruṇandi.

According to the Buddhists, the bodies are formed by means of the four elements and their inherent qualities. But the Siddhāntin criticises this view thus: The four elements and their qualities (*bhūta uru* and *upādāna uru*) cannot by themselves unite. To air, apart from its quality, *viz.*, touch, the other qualities of fire, water and earth, *viz.*, *rūpa*, *rasa* and *gandha* (form, taste and smell) respectively, cannot be united. To fire, other than its quality of form, the qualities of air, water and earth, *viz.*, touch, taste and smell cannot be united. To water, except its quality of taste, the qualities of fire, air and earth *viz.*, form, touch and smell cannot be united. To earth, other than its quality of smell, the qualities of water, fire and air *viz.*, taste, form and touch cannot be united. Hence these elements and their qualities (eight in number) cannot form the bodies. Aruṇandi says that one should understand that these elements and their qualities are all objects of senses, and cannot thus constitute the knowing soul.

The Buddhists hold that even as medicated oil contains the extracts of medicinal herbs, the eight various forms of matter exist subtly. If this be the case, argues the Siddhāntin, then God is required to create matter and to adduce their inherent qualities as the physician prepares the medicated oil. If these eight (*i.e.*, four elements and four qualities) constitute the creation of matter, then they should be uniform in kind. But in reality we find the different natures of matter and one's quality cannot be seen in the other. Apart from that, the Buddhists cannot distinguish between the elements (*urupporu!*) and their qualities (*upādhāyapporu!*). Strictly speaking, the latter has the qualities of the elements and they constitute the universe, as held by Aruṇandi.

If the Buddhists claim that the preceding moment of consciousness becomes extinct and generates the succeeding moment of consciousness, then what is dead could never create another one. Again, the new intelligence cannot know the things and remember the acts done by the past intelligence. If the Buddhists say that the old intelligence becomes extinct after creating the new intelligence, then it follows that the two intelligences co-exist. If the Buddhists argue that the earlier intelligence does not cease completely, but subsists till creating the subsequent intelligence and then perishes, then intelligence being both existent and non-existent (*nithy-ānithyam*) in its nature, it cannot be said that it is *anityam*. To this argument the Buddhists may reply that just as the straw, leaves etc., decay and become manure to produce new plants, the old intelligence dies and creates a new intelligence. But in this instance cited, argues the Siddhāntin, the Buddhists have forgotten one thing, *i.e.*, the old straw, leaves etc., do not decompose completely but are reduced to their subtle energy and make the new plant grow. Similarly, the intelligence is not momentary. Even as the manure and the plant are different, the intelligence and the objects known through that are different.

The Buddhists may say that sentience emerges due to the succession of ideas. In that case, argues the Siddhāntin,

the association must be eternal. To illustrate their stand, the Buddhists cite the instance of the flow of water in a stream where the old passes away and the new flows in. Similarly, the moment one intelligence goes out, a new one replaces it. If this be the case, then the Siddhāntin proceeds to state that the contents in the first flow of water will flow away with it alone and similarly will die the *śīlam* (goodness), *bhāvanā* (reflection), *kurī* (contemplation) and *viññāna* (wisdom) along with the old intelligence and they can never be united to the new one. If the Buddhists further hold that even as the current of water is a continuous flow, the sentience is also continuous, then this knowledge must be eternal and not *anitya* (impermanent).

“Is the idea of uninterrupted succession of consciousness held by the Buddhists refer to the cause or the effect or both”? asks the Siddhāntin. In any of these cases, according to him, the consciousness must be eternal. If the consciousness is the cause, since it is recurring ever, it is eternal; if effect, then it is also eternal. If, as cause and effect, the succession again manifests, then such manifestation takes place for ever and hence it also has permanency. If the consciousness is separate, then it is different from the senses and as such it will become an eternal object. As a result, instead of knowing the consciousness as a subject and other things as objects, the Buddhists reverse the order that the consciousness becomes the object and the senses, the subject. The Siddhāntin requests the Buddhists to look into the absurdity of their stand. If the Buddhists argue that consciousness perishes and emerges at one and the same time, then creation and destruction must become one activity. If the changing modes of a thing constitute time, then Aruṇandi asks: Why do the Buddhists postulate the three dimensions of time such as past, present and future? If the Buddhists maintain that there is no time since the object is born, exists and undergoes changes, then they should not talk about the three periods of time *viz.*, past, present and future, and all the activities of things must happen at one

time. If all the threefold functions of the things (manifestation, sustenance and destruction) take place at one and the same time, then also there are three kinds of time. The Siddhāntin cites the example of inserting a needle through one hundred lotus-petals. Though the time taken for this activity is small, still one can perceive the three kinds of time successively like the time of inserting, time of passing through and time of coming out at the other end of the petals.

To the contention of the Buddhists that one knowledge is produced from another knowledge, Aruṇandi replies that since the Buddhists postulate momentariness to knowledge, one knowledge cannot be permanent and cause another. If the body is said to create it, then such a knowledge should persist in deep sleep too. But this is not observed in experience. If the function of the senses is said to be the cause of knowledge, then, as the senses are active, the knowledge should be ever produced and can never perish. If *karma* causes knowledge, then any *karma* must be knowledge itself. In that case, it is not correct to hold that there will be no such thing as an act at all, according to Aruṇandi.

The Buddhists hold that *karma* begets knowledge and knowledge begets *karma*. The Siddhāntin refutes this by saying that even as knowledge has memory, *karma* should also have memory. Actually it is not so and since *karma* is non-intelligent, one cannot produce the other. As everything is stated to be impermanent (momentary), one cannot produce the other. Even as fire produced from a piece of firewood destroys the firewood itself, knowledge, being born from *karma* will destroy *karma* itself. This is a fallacious argument made by the Buddhists. For, as soon as knowledge dawns, it destroys *karma* itself and one cannot produce the other in succession. Knowledge too cannot produce *karma* just as the fire which burns the firewood cannot produce another one.

The Buddhists assert that there exist the devils, celestials, Brahmā and others embody themselves on earth without a father and mother. But as a body is an effect, then there must be a cause for it. If this were granted, is that body caused by consciousness, or pure (subtle) matter (*suddhāttakam*) or *karma* or any other agent? If these questions are investigated, then real wisdom will dawn that there are causes for the world like primary cause (*ādikāraṇam*), instrumental cause (*tuṇaikkāraṇam*) and the efficient cause (*nimitta kāraṇam*) who is the Lord.

The Buddhists hold that other than the five *skandhas* such as body (*rūpam*) sensation (*vedanai*) perception (*kurippu*) reflection (*bhāvanai*) and consciousness (*viññānam*), there is no such separate entity called the *ātman*. It is only *buddhi* or *viññāna* that understands these five categories and none else. Then the question remains who has the knowledge of this *buddhi*? The Buddhists reply that even as a lamp illumines itself and the objects simultaneously, the *buddhi* reveals itself and the other things. In that case, the Siddhāntin replies, as the eye perceives the lamp and other objects, a soul must be there to realize the *buddhi* and other senses and objects. Again, the Buddhists regard the soul as nothing more than the senses and mind in the body. But such a body is not aware of things in sleep. The senses too are incapable of perception in sleep. The Siddhāntin asserts firmly that there must be a soul which is conscious of intelligence, senses and the objects known through them even as the eye sees the lamp and other objects.

The Buddhists regard the soul as nothing more than the *indriyas*, mind and body. But the body as well as the senses are, the Siddhāntin shows, not aware of things in sleep. Also, the senses are incapable of perceiving the sensations of each other. Hence they cannot constitute the soul which is a conscious principle. Again, since, according to the Buddhists, the mind is momentary, it cannot perceive the three periods of time, namely, past

present and future. Moreover, the soul, according to the Siddhāntin, is that which realises body, senses and mind and their characteristics. It claims then as 'my body', 'my senses', and 'my mind', and knows that they are not "I", but knows the objects in the mind as informed by the senses and acts through the body.

The Buddhists declare that there is no soul independent of the mind while the mind alone perceives the objects. But this is plainly wrong according to Aruṇandi. When one says 'I said so', only the mouth utters these words. On that ground, can we say that the mouth said such words understanding their meaning? The person utters the words and that which says 'I know' after knowing everything by means of the senses is the soul. The soul is characterised by the Siddhāntin as that which perceives through the mind, utters through the mouth and acts through the body.

There are two kinds of consciousness (*chittam*), according to the Buddhists, such as knowledge arising from the function of the senses and that which is born of the mind. Among these two, one comes into existence after the extinction of the other. The Siddhāntin rejects this view by saying that in that event a person cannot reveal his dream experiences when he wakes up and *vice-versa*. Besides, a man born blind can never see the form of other objects and colours. Hence it cannot be said that there are two kinds of knowledge. If the Buddhists maintain that this visual knowledge does arise because of the lack of the necessary instrument, *i.e.*, sight, then during deep sleep there is no function of the senses and there is no knowledge of things obtained in waking and dreaming states. In such cases nothing remains if the Buddhist theory of momentary consciousness is to be trusted, to bring them back again to consciousness. But when the person wakes up from sleep, he remembers all the experiences that happened to him before going to sleep and in the course of his dreams earlier. This will not be possible unless there is a soul that continues to be present when mind and

senses are absent. Therefore, consciousness belongs to the soul and is permanent.

If the Buddhists claim that knowledge arises in a single sense at a particular moment only, then how are we to account for the non-perception of the sound in a single ear? (Actually sound is heard by both the ears). Also, at one moment, a person looks at another person with his two eyes, hear him with his two ears and recognises him with his mind. Apart from the mind, the five external senses have no perception of any sort. What is known by the sense organs independently is not understood by the mind at one and the same moment. The sense organs too perceive objects one by one separately. Moreover, one sense does not perceive what the other perceives. It is only the mind, which, in association with the senses, has pure knowledge. It is the soul which knows everything through the sense organs and the mind, according to Aruṇandi.

The Buddhists maintain that the formless and conscious mind associates with the five senses and all the six undergo change every moment. But the Siddhāntin says that since mind is formless, it cannot unite with the body and undergo changes such as infancy, youthfulness and old age. When a man's sleep is disturbed and he regains consciousness, wherefrom does his consciousness come? If the Buddhists say that it is from the mind that consciousness arises, then the Siddhāntin argues that consciousness cannot proceed from mind and become conscious through the senses. Even the senses and the qualities of the elements like sound and air cannot rouse the mind, as they are unconscious (*asat*). When the wick is extinguished, the light will also vanish. Citing this example, the Siddhāntin asks the Buddhists, "Where does consciousness subsist when a man is in a condition of swoon?"

The soul, according to the Siddhāntin is characterised by the following factors *viz.*, desire and hatred, effort, pleasure and knowledge. Among these, desire means aspir-

ing for a thing, say a fruit, whose taste is already known and recalling such experience at the present moment. Hatred and desire do have the same experience and the other qualities also imply similar previous experience. Since the soul experiences the future, it must be permanent, not momentary as the Buddhists believe.

The Buddhists deny the existence of space, time and direction. The Siddhāntin accepts all of them as real entities. Space exists permanently as providing room for the movement of objects, and is all-pervasive. It is neither darkness nor light. But provides room for both. Its unique attribute is sound. Air, fire and other elements originate and dissolve in space. The Siddhāntin has already explained his views about the soul.

Time has its divisions of phases as morning, noon and evening and divisions of periods as past, present and future. It is ever changing and is responsible for good and evil.

The cardinal points or directions are four: East, West, South and North. These are also eternal and invariable and yield fruits to those who perform acts in these directions.

The Buddhists assert that there is neither a creator nor scripture. Aruṇandi brings forth the causal argument that even as pot etc., require a potter, the world which is an effect requires a creator. The *Vedas* and *Āgamas* are the basic scriptures which enunciate *dharma*, *arthā*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* and also teach about duties and knowledge. These have been chanted by great sages from generation to generation and such an encyclopaedic text should have been authored by an omniscient being and that is God. And god is the real witness for all duties prescribed by the scripture.

The Siddhāntin responds to the statement of the Buddhists that trees do not have life thus: since the trees contract and expand, they have life. It is but natural for the

trees to grow when watered and wither away when not done so. If the Buddhists claim that the trees etc., do not have soul as they lack the attribute of consciousness, it is argued by Aruṇandi that the bodies with life naturally grow when nourished with food and decay without food. As the dead trees do not grow even if watered, the trees etc., have life. If the Buddhists deny life to the trees etc., since they do not possess senses etc., the Siddhāntin holds that even eggs and pawn have life, but have no sense organs in eggs etc., afterwards (*i.e.*, after they are hatched), but we do not witness sense organs even to the grown up trees. The Siddhāntin argues that though the sense-organs are not visible to us, they have flowers and fruits and hence they have organs and life.

The Buddhists ask whether one life multiplies into many as in the case of transplantation of one branch of a tree. The reply is negative that the souls enter into seeds, roots, branches and the eyes of trees, as their womb and are born. The lives born of eggs and foetus have the power of locomotion while the trees do not have such power and hence there is no soul, argue the Buddhists. Can any lame man walk on this huge earth?, asks the Siddhāntin in reply. There are infinite varieties of creation.

The Buddhists assert that tasting the flesh of an animal is not a sin while butchering it alone is a crime. Aruṇandi replies that because of the meat-eaters, there are slaughter-houses. To the vegetarians none would offer meat. If the Buddhists say that only the butchers will get sin and are to be blamed, what kinds of penance do the Buddhists perform to those who feed them! Moreover, while eating the flesh, the Buddhists offer it to their deity. They seldom realize that when they despise their own body as impure they have no sense of shame to eat the flesh of lower animals.

The Buddhists believe that even as the shadow of an umbrella resembles an umbrella, and the image of an

object in a mirror reflects the same object, when this body is disintegrated another body comes into existence. The Siddhāntin replies that if the cause (umbrella, the object) is removed, then the effect (*viz.*, the shadow) is also removed. Similarly, if the five *skandhas* are destroyed, the consciousness will also get dissolved and hence there will be none to attain *nirvāṇa*. If the Buddhists say that the consciousness is again generated from the memory caused by *karma* like the dream knowledge flourishing as real, then (the spawn, the eggs and the blind man will certainly be liberated after losing their vitality) what is the destiny of the spawn, the eggs and the blind man when their consciousness is worn out? Hence the consciousness of *karma* will not leave the bodies in any birth *i.e.*, the soul will never be separated from the body.

According to the Buddhists, the experience of bliss in liberation is the annihilation of the five *skandhas* and the destruction of bondage and suffering like the burning of camphor. The Buddhists also assert that there is no one who attains bliss in liberation after the annihilation of the five *skandhas*. In that case, the Siddhāntin asks: to whom is the bliss of *nirvāṇa* granted? If it is to the consciousness born of the five *skandhas*, then it cannot perish, and cannot leave its body and there too it evolves the five *skandhas*. Consequently, even at the state of release bondage and suffering arise causing affliction.

Arulnandi proceeds to explain his concept of *mukti*. Lord Hara (Śiva), who is eternally pure, the supreme, the immutable, omniscient, omnipotent and gracious comes as the divine preceptor to those whose good and evil *karmas* are equalized and bestows His Grace after the nullification of the impurities and when the mind and the senses are under perfect control. The Lord also shows the path of wisdom and bestows eternal bliss. Out of His boundless grace, the Lord saves the souls. This is the conception of *mukti* according to the Siddhāntin.

(B) THE YOGĀCĀRA SCHOOL

This school is also known as Vijñānavāda since pure knowledge (*bodhi*) can be realized through *yoga*. This school belongs to the Mahāyāna sect of Buddhism. It admits the reality of the mind (*ālayavijñāna*) to ensure perfect thinking and perfect knowledge. As this school emphasises that there is only one kind of reality and that it is of the nature of consciousness and that the "external" world is of the nature of ideas or states of consciousness, it is called Vijñāna-vāda. According to Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, "The title *Yogācāra* brings out the practical side of the philosophy while Vijñānavāda brings out its speculative features."

Arulnandi summarises the entire philosophy of this school in a single verse and refutes its concepts in two verses. According to him, the Yogācāra, not knowing the scriptures perfectly, states his views thus: The world is a dream and consciousness alone is true because consciousness evolves as the senses and the forms of perception. The intelligence emerges in association with the sense experience and also it is formless. This view is contrary to that of Sautrāntika position.

REFUTATION

The Yogācāra admits, in addition to intelligence, *vādana* or impressions and he does not say that these two are different. If they are one and the same, then when the intelligence gets united with the objects in attachment, the *vādana* makes the intelligence drawn towards these objects again and again. Therefore, *vādana* is different from intelligence. Since a dream contains objects experienced in waking life, the world is not a dream. Hence what the Yogācāra said is also fictitious, and not the world, according to Arulnandi.

Again, if intelligence is the sole reality and if matter is only a set of ideas, then one has to say 'I am the body.'

If intelligence and matter are different, then my intelligence unrelated to matter, declares 'I am matter'. When the intelligence is united to matter, then it will appear as matter itself like the crystal which takes upon itself the colour of the object reflected in it.

(C) *MĀDHYAMIKA SCHOOL*

Nāgārjuna, the founder of this school has interpreted the original teachings of the Buddha to mean 'the doctrine of the middle path' or 'the doctrine of Sūnya Vāda'. The whole universe is *sūnya* or void and it is devoid of reality whatsoever, according to this school. In Western nomenclature this school has been called as nihilism. "The venerated Buddha,...having taught that of the illusory superposed (silver, etc.), the basis (nacre, etc.), the connection between them, the act of vision, and the videns, if one or more be unreal it will, perforce ensure that all are unreal, all being equally objects of the negation the Mādhyamikas excellently wise explain as follows, *viz.*, that the doctrine of Buddha terminates in that of a total void (universal baselessness or nihilism) by a slow progression like the intrusive steps of a mendicant, through the position of a momentary flux, and through the (gradual) negation of the illusory assurances of pleasurable sensibility, of universality, and of reality. The ultimate principle, then, is a void emancipated from four alternatives, *viz.*, from reality, from unreality, from both (reality and unreality), and from neither (reality nor unreality). To exemplify this: If real existence were the nature of a water-pot and the like, the activity of its maker (the potter) would be superfluous"¹⁰

Śivajñāna Munivar says that if the objects of the world are real, they cannot perish; if they are unreal, they cannot originate; to say that they are both real and unreal is contradictory; if we say that both are non existing, then there will be no knowledge of them at all. Hence the objects which do not come under any of these categories are

said to be void (*sūnya*). The Mādhyamikas sincerely adhere to the teachings of their Master, the Buddha, which are codified in the *piṭaka* works. The followers of this school did not enquire further over their Master's teachings. Therefore the name Mādhyamika is given to this school, according to Śivajñāna Munivar, since the followers of this school occupy a middle position accepting the teachings of the master and not interrogating further.¹¹

Arulnandi presents the factors of Mādhyamika Buddhism in a single verse and refutes it in two verses as in the case of Yogācāra school. The Mādhyamikas, according to Arulnandi, say that the senses appear as the body. When the senses perish, it will become difficult to refer to anything as body and hence there is no body at all (as substance). Since there is no body, there is no intelligence connected with the body.

REFUTATION

The Mādhyamika has said that only the attributes constitute the body and not the substance. But the attributes of a pot are not present in a cloth and *vice-versa*. As each substance exists with its respective attributes, both the attributes and the substance must be admitted to unite together to form an object. In the same way, the body and the soul are formed as substance and attributes.

The senses and sensations and objects cannot produce perfect knowledge unless the soul unites itself with the senses and the objects and makes cognition feasible. As such, the soul and its intelligence are real.

(D) VAIBHĀṢIKA SCHOOL

This school of thought belongs to the Hīnayāna and since this school treats the language of other schools as absurd (*viruddhābhāṣa*), it gets the title. In the words of Sivajñāna Munivar, 'Vaibhāṣikas are those who claim that the knowledge of the external world is known through perception and that *vyāpti* is perceived to form the inference.

This view is opposed to the other views (*mārukoḷurai*) and hence this school is called by this title.¹² Also, it follows the Nibhāsa or the commentary on the *Abhidhamma* texts and rejects the authority of the *sūtras*. Hence also it is called as Vaibhāṣika.

This sect considers knowledge as produced by direct contact with the object. The external objects are ascertained because they are perceived and even inference follows perception. The Vaibhāṣika school thus subscribes to the theory of direct realism that the external objects are directly perceived and known. Aruṇandi states the salient features of this system in a single verse and refutes it in one verse.

Vaibhāṣika holds, according to Aruṇandi, that when perceptive intelligence and the object of perception combine, the worldly objects will be known even as when saffron and lime are mixed together, we get red colour. This is known as *jñāna darśana*. The followers of Vaibhāṣika lovingly assert that those who realize this well will attain liberation.

REFUTATION

Aruṇandi criticises this school by saying that the objects of knowledge are external and the knowing subject is internal. Hence in the act of knowing they cannot unite. Moreover, knowledge (*jñāna*) is formless (*arūpam*) and the objects of knowledge (*jñeya*) have form (*rūpam*) and for this reason also they cannot unite.

EVALUATION

There is a view that Buddhism is a disguised version of Upaniṣadic teachings. For, the Buddha has extracted the crux of human problem discussed in the sacred texts of Hinduism and has simplified it as to suit the day-to-day problems of men. In the words of Prof. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, "The Buddha stands pre-eminently for the blend of

wisdom with compassion. That suffering is due to ignorance, the sole cure for which is knowledge, this was an Upaniṣadic truth, which was but re-discovered by the Buddha."¹³ But none can deny that, as humanist, the Buddha analysed the problems of human suffering and offered his own solutions. However, the philosophical indoctrination by his followers, has given rise to divergent views among the followers. Probably, it is due to the influence of Hindu philosophical systems, that later epistemology, metaphysics, religion and ethics were systematically evolved around the basic teachings of the Buddha.

Arulnandi, without considering the origin, development and the divisions of Buddhism, straightaway proceeds to discuss the philosophy of the Sautrāntika school of Buddhism. In the *Supakkam* also the author discusses the salient features of Śaiva Siddhānta by repudiating the alien views such as Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika etc. (I,1,5.). But he has not tried to give the origin of Sautrāntika, but simply says that he is one among the four followers of the Buddha. "The name Sautrāntika arose from the fact that the venerated Buddha said to certain of his disciples who asked what was the ultimate purport (*anta*) of the aphorism (*sūtra*), 'As you have inquired the final purport of the aphorism, be Sautrāntikas'."¹⁴

In the first verse referring to the Sautrāntika school, Arulnandi refers to five vows (*śīlam*) known as *satya*, *ahimsā*, *asteya*, *brahmacarya* and *sangraha*. Some thinkers may interpret the word '*śīlam*' to mean the five *skandhas*. The entire verse points out the ethical doctrines of the Sautrāntika, while the idea of the nature of consciousness etc., are dealt with in the subsequent verses. Arulnandi in the same verse says, சாதிதான் இலாத கொள்கைச் சொத்திராந்திகன்.... Tattavaprakāsar, the commentator of this text, interprets this line to mean 'non-discrimination of caste by the Sautrāntika'. This interpretation seems to be misleading. If the Sautrāntikas are said to have developed non-casteism, it implies that the remaining three schools

practised casteism. Though Buddhism emerged as an altruistic school, it developed antagonism towards Brahmanism at the social and cultural levels. But there is no necessity to point out this view here by Aruṇandi whose primary task is to refute his philosophical rivals and establish his own doctrine.

The word 'சுரூபி' has another connotation *viz.*, universal. There is every reason to believe that Aruṇandi means by this term only the concept of universals (*sāmānya*) which are not admitted by the Sautrāntikas. As everything is said to be momentary, only bare particulars exist and there are no abstract universals. The concept of a universal is only *śavikalpa* and therefore false. Also, the word 'சுரூபி' may mean origin. In that sense Aruṇandi also might have meant this when he said: 'சுரூபிதான் இலாத' (there is no origin for the world of objects or there was no creation at any time by any creator). All these varied interpretations are adduced because Aruṇandi simply refers to this idea and has not discussed it either in the presentation of Sautrāntika or its refutation.

Logically it may be sound to argue that the Buddha was not an omniscient person. But it is said that the Buddha propounded his theses like the four noble truths etc., only after attaining *nirvāṇa* which gave rise to philosophical implications such as the doctrine of no-soul, *karma*, of momentariness etc. Aruṇandi takes up the premises of the Buddha himself to set aside his views and omniscience to him *i.e.*, whether the Buddha has revealed his *dharma* etc., before attaining *nirvāṇa* or after, is viewed seriously. Aruṇandi concludes that in either case the Buddha has not succeeded in his endeavour. But one may feel that it would be more wise to consider his revelations and justify their validity instead of doubting the Master's attainment of *mukti*.

Aruṇandi refutes the contention of the Buddhists that Buddha had performed various virtuous deeds and gra-

ciously gave out the *Piṭaka* texts, by saying that somebody before the Buddha might have determined the virtues and vices. In that case whom to venerate as the genuine preceptor? It may be recalled that Buddhism has simplified the Brāhmanic teachings, but the Buddha revealed his own findings after his enlightenment. We believe that the contents of the *Vedas* and *Upaniṣads* are the expositions of the seers who have revealed their experiences. No orthodox person doubts the veracity of these texts. Similarly, the question of accepting Buddha as a Master does not arise at all, if we consider his teachings as his own revelations and not borrowed. Each religion adores and keeps in high esteem its sacred scriptures and Buddhism is no exception to this trend.

In his reply to the contention of the Sautrāntika that space is relative, Aruṇandi simply states that there are four directions known as East, West South and North and those who perform certain *karmas* towards these directions will be rewarded with suitable fruits. Neither the author nor the commentator has explained this statement clearly. Any human being has to act by being in any one of these directions. But one doubts whether there are specific duties to be performed towards each of these directions so that one may get the stipulated fruits for the performance of the duties. Can the directions themselves yield the fruits? If it is so, then one may adore the directions themselves. Naturally such issues arise, but Aruṇandi proceeds to discuss other points in the Sautrāntika school.

Aruṇandi makes an assertion that the trees have sense organs and life since they have flowers and fruits, even though the sense organs are not visible to human beings. Here the author seems to have made a sweeping generalisation. Not all trees yield flowers and fruits. In that case how are we to recognize the sense organs and life in such trees? Further, the discussion regarding the denial of soul to trees by the Buddhists and the Śaivites' attribution of life to trees does not seem to be sound. Another discussion which

is unwarranted is about the eating of meat and butchering of animals. Though it involves a moral significance, it does not help us to understand the Siddhāntin's estimation of Buddhism. Aruṇandi charges that the Buddhists offer meat to their God. The Buddha rejected outrightly the existence of God whatsoever. The Sautrāntika Buddhism is a branch of Hīnayāna Buddhism which strictly adheres to the teachings of the Buddha. We cannot decide that meat is offered to Buddha who is adored as a God, for, it is only the Mahāyāna Buddhism which has transformed the Buddha into a God. The Buddhists generally preach to the world that human bodies are impure. How could they purify them by consuming the meat of animals?

Among the five kinds of vows, non-killing gets priority according to Sāthanār, the author of the *Maṇimekalai*. The *Dikanikāya* (111, 74) and the *Samyuttanikāya* (4,342) of the *Suttapitaka* refer to the sacred oath taken by every Buddhist, viz., 'I undertake the vow of non-killing'. The Buddhist texts reveal the incident wherein the Buddha rushed to the sacrificial pit of Bimbisara to prevent animal killing in the name of sacrifice. Buddha was the first saint to condemn killing and the Southern India underwent a reformation due to the impact of the message of non-killing and non-meat eating advocated by the Buddhists and the Jains.

However, the idea of non-vegetarian dishes had found a place in Buddhism which seriously emphasised non-killing. This may be due to later decadence. "One should not kill, but can eat the meat of animals butchered by other or which attained natural death and hence there is no vice about it." Thus says *Nilakesi*, a Jaina work in Tamil while talking about the views of some Buddhist monks. According to one tradition, Buddha himself took pork and died. But all these stories might have added by the later Buddhists who had developed meat-eating.¹⁵

As the Buddhists did not postulate an independent Being to control and reign supreme over the human souls,

they had contemplated liberation as a negative state wherein the human beings totally control the passions of all woes caused by the aggregation of the five *skandhas*. The Śaivite scholar, having been committed to the theistic way of thinking has tried to bring out the difficulties in the concept of *nirvāṇa*.

The Yogācāra school combines both critical inquisitiveness (*yoga*) and good conduct (*ācāra*) in order to establish the reality of the mind (*ālayavijñāna*) and to expose the unreliability of the external world. Aruṇandi, at the outset, straightaway dismisses this school as it lacks philosophical excellence. Though this system is reckoned as an offshoot of the Sautrāntika school, yet it has its own unique contribution. Aruṇandi, probably, thought that other than the Sautrāntika school, no other school of Buddhism was fit enough to merit his attention. Hence the meagre treatment accorded to the remaining schools of Buddhism.

The Yogācāra, however, brings to light the idea of subjective idealism and elucidates the states of mind. According to this school the subject-object distinction is to be annihilated. The teachings of this school are opposed to Śaiva Siddhānta which postulates three real categories including an external world. The total banishment of the external world from the purview of philosophical discussion cannot be appreciated by the Siddhāntin, for even to gain impressions of an object and store up in the mind objects should exist independent of the mind. "If all cognitions are empty of content, then the consciousness that there are no things is also empty. The comparison of waking to dream is due to a confusion. Dream experience is subjective and private, while the waking is not so. Objects of waking knowledge endure, while dream objects last only during dreams."¹⁶

To conclude, "While the Yogācāra theory did a great service to the science of logic, by pointing out the necessity of thought for all reality, it betrayed its weakness by its

frequent denial of all non-mental reality and experience. The use of the term *ālayaviññāna* is too indefinite.”¹¹

It is generally claimed that Mādhyamika Buddhism involves the study of excellent dialectics of Nāgārjuna, the founder of this school. It is a negative critical system which formulates the idea of middle path, *i.e.*, adopting ‘the mean between extreme affirmation and extreme negation.’ For the venerated Buddha himself avoids the two extremes, *viz.*, eternalism and nihilism or exaggerated asceticism and easy secular life. The basic doctrine of this school that the world is *śūnya* should not be understood in the sense of ‘void’ or ‘nothingness’, but in the sense of ‘indescribable’. The categories of intellect cannot understand the reality for, when any attempt is made to comprehend reality, they are baffled.

Śankara, who is not satisfied with this system, dismisses it as not worth considering. In his words, “The third variety of Buddha doctrine, *viz.*, that everything is empty (*i.e.*, that absolutely nothing exists), is contradicted by all means of right knowledge, and therefore requires no special refutation.”¹² However, Śankara uses the word ‘*śūnya*’ in the sense of nothingness. Strictly speaking, *śūnya* does not mean ‘nothing’ or an ‘empty void’ or a ‘negative abyss’, but essentially it means indescribable (*avacya* or *anabhilapyā*) as it transcends the categories of intellect.¹³

Arulnandi has not given serious attention to such subtle distinctions of the word ‘*śūnya*’, but he is interested in showing that a soul exists in the body and that alone is responsible for human intelligence. One may find that Arulnandi does not give serious attention to the metaphysical implications of the concept of *śūnya*.

While refuting this school, Arulnandi refers implicitly to the *satkāryavāda* of Śaiva Siddhānta, *i.e.*, the effect already exists in the cause. The no-soul theory of the

Mādhyamika is refuted here by saying that a substance is known through its attributes. Similarly, the existence of the soul is understood from the activities of the body and thus the realistic standpoint of Śaiva Siddhānta is affirmed.

The Vaibhāṣika school, unlike the Sautrāntika, maintains that the world of objects is known directly by means of perception and not through inference. "According to the doctrine of inferable sensibles, there being no perceptible object, and consequently no object from which a universal rule can be attained, it will be impossible that any illation should take place, and therefore a contradiction will emerge to the consciousness of all mankind. Objects therefore are of two kinds, sensible, and cogitable. Of these, apprehension is a non-discriminative instrument of knowledge as other than mere representation; cognition which is discriminative is not a form of evidence, as being a merely ideal cognition."²⁰ Arulnandi has presented and refuted this school on the basis of epistemological considerations, but has not considered its other doctrines. Probably, he might have decided to show the drawbacks in the theory of knowledge propounded by this school so as to check the further philosophical claims of this school.

To say that the objective world is known through the *sva-lakṣaṇas*, which are indefinite in number, fleeting in character and the only basis of the external world is an unwarranted assumption of which nothing can be said or known and may as well be dispensed with.²¹ Again, "The Vaibhāṣika, like the rest of the Buddhists, has attempted to work out the implications of Gotama's teaching, seems to have stopped short at the penultimate stage lest he should do violence to it, while the other schools have carried on the investigation further. One unsatisfactory character of the doctrine, viewed by itself and not in relation to its traditional basis, is due to the attempt it makes to think of reality after abolishing time and space from the objective spheres. Its dimensionless *sva-lakṣaṇas*

can have no verity about them. Herein lies its chief weakness which should have suggested to the Yogācāra the doctrine of pure subjectivism."²²

Epistemologically, Vaibhāṣikas subscribe to naive realism, since they, as natural dualists, maintain that mind and nature have independent existence.²³ "The Vaibhāṣikas, however, as well as the Sautrāntikas admit the permanent reality of the underlying elements or their extra-mental existence. No definite account is given of the relation between the underlying reality and the phenomenal manifestations. The view of the elements or the noumenal counterparts of things is not clear. We are often told that even these elements are momentary... The unity of the individual is a fiction for the continuous flow of mental states. The theory rests on naturalistic assumptions, and when strictly developed takes us to materialism or sensationalism. Realising that we are dealing with transitory phenomena, the Sautrāntikas argue that the underlying substances are inferred by us and not directly perceived."²⁴

Aruṇandi's basic question is that how the objects of knowledge (external) and the knowing mind (internal) can be united to produce knowledge. As realists, the Vaibhāṣikas advocate the theory of correspondence. Again, the formless knowledge cannot unite with the objects which have forms. Though the above view is true in a sense, it does not seem to be sound. For as soon as we say 'knowledge', we ask, 'knowledge of what?' The answer will be knowledge of 'this' or 'that'. Knowledge must have something as its object. Without a union between the knowing subject and the known object, no knowledge will be possible and that union takes place in every instance of our knowing.

4

NIGANDAVADA SCHOOL

Arulnandi explains the views of the Nigandavāda sect as follows: The adherents of this sect adore the *asoka* tree laden with sweet scented flowers encircled with bees. The Jaina monks of this sect perform austerity (*tapas*) against the Vedic tradition, abandon cloths and become nude, become dirty due to non-bathing, abjure family life, remain ascetics, eat excessively, sleep on mat and keep peacock feathers in hands. To this sect Arugadeva is the Lord who is immortal and hailed by Indra and other celestials. As the full moon is clothed in coolness, the Lord shines forth in the eight noble qualities manifested by Himself and He has relinquished eight evil qualities.'

Arugadeva, the Supreme Lord of the Nigandavādin, has not been affected by the evil influence of the *indriyas* and He, as an omniscient being, knows instantly the happenings in all places and at all times. He is the Lord of austerities, who bestows grace equally to those who worship Him and who worship not. His other auspicious qualities are as follows: The blemishless qualities represent the non-adherence to the prohibited deeds. The Lord of the Nigandavādin is untouched by the evils of hunger, thirst, fear, envy, liking, lust, contemplation, abusing, disease, death, sweating, surprise, pride, astonishment, eating, birth and sleep. But He is endowed with the eight virtuous qualities. He is supposed to have been seated in the highest heaven above this world and imparted His teachings in 'one word' to the host of siddhas who had gathered there.

The siddhas keeping in mind that one word, composed many treatises in the name of *Saraṇam*, *Yogam*, etc., mainly to desist the worldly people from delusion. The quintessence of these books is that time, space, *dharma*, *adharma*, virtue, vice, atomic bodies, bondage and release are all created by none, but exist eternally. Among these, time refers to past, present and future and comprises of all the three periods of time at once. The soul, being limited by time, embodies and fills in completely and develops as youth, adolescence, and old age. It undergoes various changes and it is of the form of intelligence. The *dharmāstikāyam* (the body taken due to virtues) helps the soul overcome the evil influences of the *kārmic* body or the *bhūtākāyam* (physical body) and subsequently the soul attains eternal liberation. On the contrary, the *adharmāstikāyam* (the body taken due to vices) keeps the soul bound by the physical body. According to Arulnandi, the virtues further the evolution of the soul towards liberation while vices contribute to the bondage of the soul. Virtuous acts performed through mind, word and deed result in *punya* while the vicious acts result in *pāpa*. *Ākāśa* or space gives room for everything including *puḍgala*. *Puḍgala* literally means matter. The matter modifies itself into several objects and Arulnandi mentions some products of matter like iron, stones, trees, etc. The six kinds of perceptual activities such as taste, sight, touch, etc., are malignant in nature causing bondage. If we are free from the clutches of these activities, we engage in the discipline called *tapas* (austerity) or good *karma*. This eventually brings forth good births. In the several births we undergo, we enjoy the fruits of virtues and vices and when they are exhausted, we attain liberation.

REFUTATION

The Nigaṇḍavādin holds that Arugadeva is devoid of eight wicked qualities and is associated with eight noble qualities like the moon and its coolness. Arulnandi points out the untenability of the analogy put forth by this Jaina

sect. Coolness in moon is inherent while virtues are only associated and acquired. Therefore, it would mean that the Lord of the Nigaṇḍavādin had already possessed evils before he laid them down. Hence superiority cannot be claimed of Him. But, if the Nigaṇḍavādin says that his Lord has annihilated the evil qualities and obtained perfection, then it would imply that someone superior to their Lord should exist to enunciate the virtues so that the aspirants would be able to attain salvation. In that case, we have to presume a Supreme Being who is more powerful than Arugadeva and who is being adored by the followers of the non-violent group. If the contention of Nigaṇḍavādin leads to the position brought out by Aruṇandi, the former has the obligation to specify the nature of the Supreme Being whom he has accepted implicitly, argues the latter.

The Nigaṇḍavādin asserts that Arugadeva has desisted from the knowledge known through the senses and mind, but has become omniscient. Then, to say that he is embodied and immortal is to affirm the existence of mind etc. In the absence of senses and mind seldom can one comprehend the things. On the other hand, if it is stated that he has no body, then it is difficult to say that he is omniscient. Rarely does he know the three dimensions of time at once to know the object. Aruṇandi argues that as Arugadeva is still in an embodied state, there is no emancipation to those who first lead a life of lust, anger, jealousy etc., and give them up subsequently knowing their perilous conditions. If the Nigaṇḍavādin denies this and compares Arugadeva to a king, then, like the king, he also has to vanquish the wicked and patronise the good. But without doing this why should He dwell in the city surrounded by golden walls? The Nigaṇḍavādins claim that the eternal Arugadeva (*Sakalathān*) made a word out of which the perfect *arhat* (*Ihalathān*) compiled the doctrines of this sect to redeem mankind. If so, argues the Siddhāntin, then it is postulated that the perfect *arhat* does not possess any senses or mind. In that case, how could he listen to

the eternal Arugadeva and give it out again? It is like the dumb teaching to the dumb.

Arulnandi proceeds to state that if Arugadeva dwells in a golden palace, a sacred and blissful region, then He cannot understand the real grievances of the people on the earth. Also as He lacks mind etc., He cannot come as a preceptor to annihilate the woes of the people. If it is emphasised that the Arugadeva knows the suffering of the earthly masses from the place where he dwells, then He too has the notion of sorrows and His golden palace of the holy land is also enshrouded with sorrows and ceases to be a holy land.

The Nigaṇḍavādin asserts that the soul pervades the body. If so, when a portion of the body becomes defective, the soul should also become defective and the size of the body should be proportionately reduced. Even as the water in a broken pot is lost, the soul will no longer survive bodily death. Therefore, it is not correct to hold, argues the Siddhāntin, that the soul pervades the whole body.

The scriptures of Arugadeva envisage that the soul, due to its virtuous deeds, takes a *dhārmic* body (*thanmā-ttikāyam*) and due to its vices an *adharmic* body (*athanmā-ttikāyam*). In the former, the embodied soul is elevated and enjoys pleasure, while in the latter it is depressed and suffers pain. Also these two types of bodies are taken at the same time by the soul. Arulnandi denies this contention that the soul can never take two bodies at one time. The Nigaṇḍavādin says that even as the worm becomes an insect and then a bird, the soul selects different bodies. The reply of Arulnandi is that in the case of beetles, they are not insects and birds simultaneously but successively. Hence the soul inhabiting two bodies simultaneously is untenable.

If the Nigaṇḍavādin says that there is no Supreme Being (*karthā*) who knows the virtues and vices of the mortal beings and makes them enjoy the fruits thereof,

then there will be no one to enjoy the bliss of heaven and to suffer the pains of hell with reference to the virtues and vices respectively. To this view, the Nigaṇḍavādin might reply that even as an arrow delivered from a bow reaches its target swiftly, the virtues and vices reach the person quickly who performed the actions. Aruṇandi points out the untenability of the simile and takes advantage of the same simile to strengthen his point. If the arrows are to be delivered from the bow, a person (bowman) is required. Likewise, a *karthā* should be presumed to appropriate the *karmas* to the individuals.

The Nigaṇḍavādin has attributed to material bodies like iron, stone etc., souls with one-sense. But while all living beings are seen to die, stones and metals do not die. Moreover, if these material bodies do have souls, then they must attain liberation. But it is meaningless to hold such a view and only the Nigaṇḍavādin entertains this idea of attributing life to lifeless things like stone etc. The Nigaṇḍavādin holds that austerity (*tapas*) is performed when the six kinds of evil actions are rooted out (cultivation, mechanical industry, writing, trading, teaching and sculpture). Aruṇandi says that in commercial trade, unless there is exchange of commodities, no profit can be gained. Similarly, in the realm of spirituality too one has to eschew evil tendencies and aspire for austerity. If it is stated by the Nigaṇḍavādin that *tapas* is attained by the fruits of past *karmas*, then getting rid of evil actions is also due to the past *karmas* and the attainment of *tapas* is impossible if one does not engage in the performance of *tapas*. This obviously is circular in reasoning and no wonder it is unconvincing to Aruṇandi.

The reward for the mortification of the body is spiritual excellence (மாதவம்) according to Nigaṇḍavādin. To this Aruṇandi's rebuttal is that if the attainment of *mokṣa* is guaranteed by the bodily suffering depriving of pleasures, then those who undergo agonies due to bodily diseases should be the first to attain *mokṣa*. If the Jains

reply that the aspiration for *mokṣa* itself warrants bodily pain, then Aruṇandi suggests circastically to cut off their noses so that they can live in bliss for ever. The Nigaṇḍavādin further argues that only after experiencing all the *karmas* of the past in this birth, one can reach the abode of golden city. But the *karmas* are limitless and hence, argues the Siddhāntin, one cannot certainly exhaust all the *karmas*. Even if the complete exhaustion of *karmas* is granted, in that stage there will be no body and senses to do austerities which are the aids to liberation. Hence to hold that one can reach the golden city after extirpating the *karmas* is like the attitude of a cat waiting to eat the fish after the ocean's drying up.

Finally, Aruṇandi criticises the view of the Nigaṇḍavādin who advocates a theory of liberation without postulating a Supreme Being, the first cause. The attempt to reach heaven without the grace of God is like the attempt of a pot at the bottom of a well to reach of itself the top. Even as a person at the top has to lift the pot out from the well, the creator God has to annihilate the *kārmic* influence and grant salvation. The creator God (*karthā*) is Śiva and so the Nigaṇḍavādin has to develop allegiance to Śiva as to follow the paths of *caryā*, *kriyā*, *yoga* and *jñāna* as enunciated in the scripture of the *Vedas* and the *Āgamas* which have Śiva as their author.

EVALUATION

The Nigaṇḍavādins as referred to by Aruṇandi are those who have relinquished food, property and clothes since they block the pathway to perfection. No women can attain liberation according to them. Though this sect has its own ecclesiastical and literary history, it does not deviate from the main creed. The philosophical doctrines of this sect are found in the *Maṇimekalai*,² a Buddhist treatise in Tamil.

Aruṇandi contemptuously considers the followers of this sect of Jainism as those who eat sumptuously. But Arugadevan, the deity of this sect has been depicted as one

who has discarded several requirements of which hunger forms the foremost. When the Lord has relinquished hunger etc., one may doubt whether the followers be gluttons. Probably, Aruṇandi might have intended to show the cleavage between the Lord and the devotees. Again, Aruṇandi gives an incomplete list of the items to be eliminated in actual life, say seventeen or eighteen. But a monk of this monastic order has to discipline his body and mind by practising twenty two endurances (*parisaha*). However, Aruṇandi seems to have given the essential endurances.

Aruṇandi brings out the Nigandavādin's conception of virtuous body (*dharmāttikāyam*) and vicious body (*adharmaṭtikāyam*) and also the causes for taking such bodies. But one is doubtful as to how to determine a body to be virtuous or vicious. On what conditions or criteria one has to decide the body? No adequate answer is found. Again, Jainism does not accept the existence of God and emphasises that man can work out his salvation by perfect living. Only god-head is approved, *i.e.*, the embodied soul after casting off all the evils becomes a perfect being as well as a Master to other embodied beings. Such an elevated soul is considered as a Lord. But Arugadeva is not a God in the theistic sense of the term. Aruṇandi, while refuting Nigandavādin, tries to show that there is a Supreme Being even to make Arugadeva a perfect Lord.

Aruṇandi speaks of Arugadeva as one of the celestial deity who dwells in a golden city and that he cannot understand the grievances of the people and if he knows, he too has been surmounted by sorrows. However, the Jains believe not in a Supreme God, but only in the elevation of human being into the level of God. Arugadeva is also one such being and not an Ultimate Being as conceived and adored by the Śaivites as Śiva. Again, the Jaina conception of the self is not acceptable to the Siddhāntin, for the latter holds that the human soul is formless, but subsists in the body in which it dwells. It is not logically correct to say that the soul assumes the form in accordance with

the shape of the body. Aruṇandi provides with adequate arguments to disprove such a conception of the soul by this sect of Jainism.

Aruṇandi cleverly incorporates the moral argument for the existence of God. When he argues that God must be there to yield the fruits of the actions to the doer, since the fruits of actions will not directly reach the persons concerned. For they are inert and unconscious and God as a moral governor has to render justice to the doer. However, the Nigaṇḍavādin holds that the results of actions will reach the doer by themselves which idea is difficult to comprehend. Aruṇandi also insists that it is impossible to exhaust all the *kārmic* influences by oneself. God's grace becomes inevitable for two obvious reasons, *viz.* (i) annihilating the *karmas* and (ii) attainment of salvation. Aruṇandi refers to this view as trade in which a small amount is invested to gain a big sum. By submitting oneself to the lotus Feet of God, one enjoys the freedom from mortality. The basic commitment of Aruṇandi to the accomplished end of the Śaiva Philosophy has made him argue against the Nigaṇḍavādin and establish his point of view.

5

AJIVAKA SCHOOL

Before proceeding to consider Aruṇandi's treatment of Ājīvaka system, let us make an useful digression to present the above system since it is generally confused with the Svetāmbara sect.

Hoernle¹ gives a fairly good account of the historical development, founder and doctrines of the Ājīvaka sect. This sect arose as an antagonistic movement of Jainism in the sixth century B.C. and it was a community of religious mendicants. Gosāla Maṅkhaliputta was said to be its founder whose name in Pāli goes as Makkhali-putta for which the Sanskrit equivalence is Maskari-putra. Regarding the name Ājīvaka, we do not find any significant information either from Aruṇandi or from any other source. Aruṇandi has not collected the materials for his treatment as in the case of other systems. In Sanskrit the word 'Ājīva' means mode of life, profession, householders and religious mendicants. It may be presumed, then, that the word 'Ājīvaka' has been derived from *ājīva* to mean that one who adopts to the mode of living suitable to his community.

It is interesting to note that the name Ājīvaka was not taken by themselves, but given to them by their opponents. "The name Ājīvaka, as appears, was originally meant to stigmatise Gosāla and his followers as professionals, though, no doubt, in later times, when it became the distinctive name of a mendicant order, it no longer carried that offensive meaning. Except the references found in the records

of their rivals — Buddhists and Jains — we do not find any record of the doctrines and practice left to us by Gosāla and his followers.”” Buddha contemptuously criticises the Ājīvakas that they were both theoretically and practically immoral. He uses the epithet ‘the bad man’ to refer to Gosāla and says that like a fisherman, he caught men merely to destroy them.

According to the *Bhagavati Sūtra* of Jainism, beyond the determinism with its practical application, there was in the main, no difference between Gosāla’s doctrines and those of Mahāvīra. Arulnandi, while presenting the doctrine of the Ājīvaka sect, states that it points out six colours known as white, brown, red, blue, super white, and green. He has not compared these colours with the types of human personalities. Mankind has been divided into six classes by Gosāla according to *Digha Nikāya*. According to Buddhghosa, “Gosāla distinguished the six classes by six colours — black, blue, red, yellow, white and supremely white. The black classes were hunters, butchers, murderers, thieves, in short, evil doers. The blue were the mendicants known as Bhikṣu, that is, the Buddhist monks. The red were the mendicants known as Niggantha who wore (at least) a strip of loin cloth. The yellow were the lay adherents of the mendicants known as Achelaka, that is, those mendicants who were no clothing whatsoever. The white were the mendicants, male as well as female, who were known as the Ājīvaka. The supremely white were the leaders of the latter: Nanda Vachchla, Kissa; Sanikichcha, and Gosāla Mankhali-putta.””

Though there was no doctrinal difference between Mahāvīra and Gosāla, yet there is a well-known difference between them. The orthodox Jains hold six groups with respect to the preparatory discipline (*parikamma*). The Ājīvakas or Terāsiyas on the contrary counted seven groups. The term ‘terāsiyas’ means those people practice everything under three aspects (*tray-ātmaka* — assertion, negation and indifference). This view resembles the idea

of *Syādvāda* promulgated by the Jains. "It follows that the Terāsiyas must have made use of it in some special way and that this special way constituted their seventh group of preparatory discipline (*parikamma*). It may further be surmised that this seventh group was concerned with the *ājīva* 'profession' of men and that for this reason the Terāsiyas had received their alternative name of Ājīvakas or professionals."

This sect of Jainism was brought to the Tamil country from the northern parts of India. A few references are found in the Sangam literature about this sect. There are no doctrinal differences between the two sects of Jainism viz., the Ājīvaka and the Nigandavādin. The differences are only with reference to practices and beliefs with regard to source books, women, sub-divisions, ascetics etc. "By and large the difference in regard to the general philosophy observable in the two sects are not of a fundamental character. This is evident from the fact that both the sets consider a Jaina classic *Tattvārthadhigama-sūtra* as most authoritative. The author of the work was probably a Svetāmbara, but the Digambaras also regard it as one of their primary source books. All the same for a non-Jaina the puritan spirit of the Digambaras is so striking that he thinks that there are fundamental differences between the Svetāmbaras and the Digambaras." The *Maṇimekalai* and the *Silappatikāram* (the famous Tamil classics) refer to the Ājīvaka sect of Jainism. In the former the religious doctrines are spoken of while in the latter it is stated that the father of Kovalan after the demise of Kovalan and Kannaki disgusted with his life joined the Ājīvaka sect.⁶

Dasgupta makes a reference to Makkhali, the founder of this sect thus:

Side by side with the doctrine of the Cārvāka materialists we are reminded of the Ājīvaka of which Makkhali Gosāla, probably a renegade

disciple of the Jain saint Mahāvīra and a contemporary of Buddha and Mahāvīra, was the leader. This was a thorough-going determinism denying the free will of man and his moral responsibility for any so-called good or evil. The essence of Makkhali's system is this, that 'there is no cause, either proximate or remote, for the depravity of beings or for their purity.' They become so without any cause. Nothing depends either on one's own efforts or on the efforts of others, in short nothing depends on any human effort, energy, or human exertion. The varying conditions at any time are due to fate, to their environment and their own nature.'

Now let us consider Aruṇandi's presentation of the Ājīvaka sect. He introduces this sect with a circastic remark. According to him, the plucking of hair is contrary to the belief of the Ājīvaka that divine grace is common to all.

The suffering inflicted by the practice of plucking the hair would make all living beings suffer. However, it is to be noted that the idea of divine grace is common to all is imputed to the Ājīvaka sect by Aruṇandi.

The import of the basic texts of Arugadeva, the Lord of infinite wisdom is as follows: Reality is constituted by five substances, viz., earth, water, fire, air and soul. These five substances manifest hardness, coldness, hotness, movement and intelligent respectively. Among these, earth and water have the tendency of going downwards while fire and air upwards. The *jīvas* inhabit the bodies which are made up of the other four substances. When the soul enters bodies, it gets the nature of that body to which it is united. This is how these substances function. It is to be noted here that Aruṇandi uses the term 'அணு' to refer to the substance.

Other than the *jīva*, the four substances cannot know each other; nor can one be reduced to the other. However, the substances unitedly act in a living body. They do not come into being afresh; nor do they perish by lapse of time. They unite always not individually but collectively. Seldom do they change their nature. Never do these substances undergo creation, development, destruction, resolution, neither can be eaten nor swallowed, nor digested, nor spit out; neither produced, nor unproduced. These substances go through beyond the cosmos and take several bodies and forms. These unfold forever and everywhere and are of the same unchanging nature.

Among the five substances, *jīva* the subtle substance is invisible to the eyes. Enforced by *karma*, it is born in the bodies with a form. As the soul becomes subtle in the gross body, human beings cannot perceive it, but only the immortal Gods realize it. The composite things are always made up of the four substances, *viz.*, earth, water, fire and air. This implies that two or three substances cannot compose a thing. According to Aruṇandi the Ājīvaka sect describes the qualities of the four substances thus: Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, form and touch; water, the qualities of taste, form, and touch; fire, the qualities of form, and touch and air, the quality of touch only. The four substances combine in various proportions to produce various objects. The objects thus produced may have any one of the five sense qualities as predominating the others.

Aruṇandi says that there are six colours according to this sect known as white, golden, red, blue, green and pure white. Among these, pure white is the colour pertaining to the heavenly regions. The other five colours will commingle with the four substances and have earthly forms. The soul perceives these forms by means of conjunction and disjunction. In the womb itself the soul is being attached to the result of the past *karms* which have the following eight aspects: wealth and poverty, pain and pleasure, living in one's own country and going abroad

old age and death. Along with the five substances the Lord Arugadeva has included virtue (*punyaṃ*) and vice (*pāpaṃ*) and makes the Jaina categories into seven. Those who understand this scheme as the highest wisdom will reach heaven.

REFUTATION

As there is no return from heaven, there is no scope for Arugaparaman (the Lord of this sect) to incarnate himself on the earth. As such, he cannot contribute the aphorisms (Jaina texts) nor can the texts come into being by themselves. All the five substances cannot unite themselves at Heaven and so the Lord cannot have any body. Therefore, the Lord can never know anything at all. The Ājīvakas unknowingly declare that there are two classes of *arhats viz., Maṇḍalārs* and *Sembothakars*. The former are those who inhabit the earth while the latter are the perfect ones. The *Maṇḍalārs* descend to the earth and reveal the teachings of their Lord. Aruṇandi argues that if this is the case, then these people cannot be distinguished from the rest of the people on earth. Then partaking in both earthly and divine aspects is inconceivable.

It is wrong to hold that the soul attains knowledge by its contact with the body. If that were so, a man of indolence and an infant should possess knowledge. However, they do not have knowledge. If the Ājīvakas maintain that of the four substances, two have upward tendency and the other two have downward tendency, then it is not possible for the four substances to form the body since two of them go upward and two of them go downward causing separation and not union. Even if, by chance, they combine to form a body, at any time they may separate themselves and the body will eventually be destroyed. If the substances are independent, then there should be space between them. This would imply that they cannot come together to form a body, being eternally independent. Thus the inconsistency in the Ājīvaka belief that the four

substances unite to form the body is pointed out by Arulnandi.

It follows from the above discussion that the substances would be innumerable, distinct and independent, defying any grouping or classification. Since they are distinct, Arulnandi reasons that they should have opposite qualities virtually making one the enemy of the other. The strong substance would destroy the weaker. This implication is contrary to the Ājīvaka belief that the substances are eternal. Thus the Ājīvaka contention that the four substances unite to form the body is as laughable as the contention that thousand sticks by themselves could form a pillar. Thus the futility of the metaphysics of the Ājīvaka sect is very clearly brought out by Arulanandi, for, a significant metaphysics should help us to understand reality in terms of few categories.

After showing the futility of the Ājīvaka metaphysics, Arulnandi tries to prove the existence of God as an implication of the metaphysics of the Ājīvaka itself. The untenability of the union of the substances was already pointed out. Arulnandi adduces another reason that the substances cannot unite because they are non-intelligent. If the Ājīvakas say that the air is the agent of the union, it cannot be so for the same reason that it is unintelligent. The doctrine of *karma* cannot be brought in because it also meets with the same fate, that is, being insentient. Therefore, it is unavoidable and proper for the Ājīvakas to accept the existence of God who can bring about the union of the substances to form the body that can be inhabited by the self.

EVALUATION

Since there is no doctrinal difference between Ājīvaka sect and Jainism proper, we may note that the metaphysical categories according to Ājīvakas are six in number which come under the two exhaustive categories,

viz., *jīva* and *ajīva*. Under *ajīva* we have *pudgala* (matter) *kāla* (time) *dharma* (principle of motion) *adharmā* (principle of rest) and *ākāśa* (space). According to the Jainas, earth, water, fire and air are the products of *pudgala*. Therefore, the four substances enumerated by Aruṇandi come under one category only. But Aruṇandi counts these as four and includes *jīva* and *pāpa* and *puṇya* and call these as the seven categories of Jainism. This is obviously a misunderstanding of Jaina metaphysics.

Further, it is to be noted that the two categories, *pāpa* and *puṇya* which are considered as metaphysical categories, are actually ethical categories of Jainism. Apart from *pāpa* and *puṇya*, Jainism recognises *āśrava bandha*, *saṃvāra*, *nirjara*, and *mokṣa* as ethical categories. Of these, *pāpa* and *puṇya* are mistaken as metaphysical categories and no mention has been made regarding the other ethical categories.

6

BHATTACARYA SCHOOL

Jaimini, the founder of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā system, wanted to defend and justify Vedic ritualism. The *Vedas* consist of two sections — the sections dealing with actions (*karma-kāṇḍa*) and knowledge (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*). Jaimini formulated the theory of ritualism in strict adherence to the Vedic injunctions. The purport of his epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and religion is the Vedic injunctions. To the *sūtras* of Jaimini, Sabarasvāmi wrote the major commentary which was followed by several scholars. The two most prominent among them were: (1) Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and (2) Prabhākara, the founders of the two schools named after them.

Arūṇānandī first takes up the Bhāṭṭa school of Mīmāṃsā and then that of Prābhākara. Other than the four *Vedas* nothing is true and God is not the creator of the *Vedas* according to Kumārila, the disciple of Jaimini, who interpreted Jaimini's texts. The primary concern of this sect of Mīmāṃsā is that by performing the *karmas* as enjoined in the *Vedas*, one can reach heaven. The human souls are endowed with the detestable characters such as lust, greed, anger, etc., and hence it would be inappropriate to hold that the *Vedas* have been given out by human beings. If these *guṇas* produce knowledge, then the Vedic statements will be of no use and false. Books can be written only by men of knowledge, but knowledge can be acquired only by studying books. Those who do not acquire knowledge by studying will be either immature babies or dumbs.

This means that the books must be already existing to get knowledge. This is what really the contention of Mīmāṃsā. And, by implication, the *Vedas* could not have been written by any human being. If it is affirmed that God has revealed the *Vedas*, and He is devoid of body and soul, then while revealing the Vedic texts, He should have been embodied. Consequently, He becomes a man and His wisdom depends on the books He has mastered. If He has no visible forms, then He can have no mind to think and no mouth to utter. Hence it is to be understood that the *Vedas* have no divine origin.

Further, Bhaṭṭācārya holds that the celestials, (*devas*) sages, *siddhas* and human beings (*narars*) assert that they could not understand about the authorship of the *Vedas*. From one generation to the other the *Vedas* have been continuously imparted to the people. Since the *Vedas* refer to the future births and states, they could have no human author either. The *Vedas* comprise of six *aṅgas* and three *Upavedas*. The meaning of the Vedic texts is within themselves and depend not on other works for their elucidation. The *Vedas* have neither beginning nor end but eternal.

The *Vedas* contain informations regarding the injunctions and prohibitions, the description of the genuine paths, and the various *mantras* and their respective *devas*. We cannot categorise the *Vedas* as having one systematic study. For we have plurality of subjects in them. When people realize the past, present and future, the *Vedas* become the life-force and reveal their unified truth. It implies that in the beginning they were formless. The Vedic statements are unimpeachable with noncomparable bases and verbal roots. They also instruct the method of pronunciation. If one performs the rituals as recommended by the *Vedas*, then the binding factors are weakened and everlasting happiness is ensured.

The vast universe is said to exist for ever and has neither dissolution nor creation of any sort. The universe,

according to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, is constituted by the atoms. The atoms combine to produce the universe due to the merits and demerits (*karmas*) of the souls. The universe is eternal and does not require a separate creator for its production. The universe manifests itself in the *tattvas* from earth, etc. The soul is eternal, all pervasive and intelligent. The *antahkaraṇas* are the instruments of the self, but the self is different from the instruments. By itself it is pure and formless, but due to the past *karma* it inhabits a body and experiences through the senses.

The virtues and vices of the previous birth continue in the present birth too in the subtle form associated with the soul. According to Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, the actions will produce their own effects. Probably, here Aruṇandi refers to the *apūrva* concept of the Bhāṭṭa according to which the past actions will leave their impressions or unseen potencies which will produce effect in the subsequent births. This is like the straw, grass and other leaves used as manure in the fields which help the growth of vegetations. The performance of daily rites as enunciated in the scriptures will yield happiness. The faultless performance of *iccā karma* and *agnihotra* will make one attain the desired ends. The *yāgas* like *soma*, while performed in all sincerity, will lead to happiness in heaven.

The performance of the *karmas* as prescribed in the *Vedas* and the knowledge that the *Vedas* are internal and uncaused are the means for liberation. Relinquishing the *karmas* by believing that *jñāna* alone will suffice for liberation, will make one an outcaste (a sinner) for whom no redemption is prescribed even in the *Vedas*. The *Vedas* declare that one can enrich with virtues by regularly performing Vedic sacrifices and *yāgas*. One can derive pleasure by genuinely chanting the Vedic *mantras* like a man who appeases his appetite by taking real food.

REFUTATION

Aruṇandi proceeds to refute the contention of Bhāṭṭas as follows: In the *Vedas* there is no reference to the uncaused

nature (*Svayambu*) of the *Vedas* and only the Bhaṭṭācārya holds that the *Vedas* are uncaused. If there is any other *pramāṇa* to state that the *Vedas* are uncaused, let the Bhāṭṭas bring it out. The *Mahābhārata*, the grand epic, has an author (Vyāsa) and similarly the *Vedas* too should have an author. Even as the products of earth and cotton are seldom made in the absense of potters and weavers respectively, the Vedic texts could not have come into existence unless revealed by a person. And that person is none other than the Lord with the crescent moon (Chandra-sekara).

If the Bhāṭṭas claim that the *Vedas* were not revealed by God, but came into existence by themselves, then they must be mere noises in the sky devoid of any meaning. But if they deny this view and hold that even as a lamp reveals the objects and itself, the *Vedas* reveal everything and make themselves known, then the *Vedas* do not have reputations, but have only limitations. This view is akin to that of Kapila, the founder of Nirīśvara Sāṅkhya system. It is difficult to account for the beginning as well as the end of the *Vedas*. Further, there is no method to prove the form and formless aspects of the *Vedas* i.e., it is difficult to show that the *Vedas* were formless at one time and gained form at a latter time.

The Bhāṭṭas say that the *Vedas* illumine by getting united with a person. In that case, they do not describe the person and hence even from the sound of the frogs *Vedas* may be revealed. The contention of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā that there is no another to the *Vedas* is based on the reason that the author himself is not perceived. According to Aruṇandi, this cannot be a reason for rejecting the authorship of the *Vedas*. The rejection, according to Aruṇandi, is similar to the contention that there is no maker of the cloth imported from an island, since the maker himself is not perceived. Again, the Bhāṭṭas may argue that people of different countries with different languages consider the *Vedas* as true and chant them

invariably and hence the *Vedas* are uncaused. Aruṇandi replies that the above argument will be similar to the statement which says that pots produced in different countries in many varieties do not have any cause. However, to produce the pot the potter is required. The faultless recitation of the *Vedas*, according to the Bhāṭṭas, will result in happiness. This is like saying that the flowers acquire fragrance after becoming a garland. This contention of the Bhāṭṭas, according to Aruṇandi, is like the meaningless roaring of the sea.

According to Aruṇandi, as the human soul is united to the body, the universal soul, *viz.*, God treats the universe as His body and graciously has revealed the Vedic texts to us. Since God is eternal and uncaused, His utterances also become eternal and uncaused. This idea resembles the attitude of the people who regard the royal order as the very presence of the king himself and honour it. Further, if the Bhāṭṭas say that the *Vedas* are meant for the first three castes (Brāhmins, Kṣatriyas and Vaiśyas), then how are we to account for the astrologers who hail from the fourth caste and master the art without knowing the language of the *Vedas*? In the northern part of India, no caste is prohibited from reciting the *Vedas*. To claim that the *Vedas* are self-contained and are of the nature of sound, but to deny any authorship is like saying that a born baby has no mother.

If the Bhāṭṭas say that the soul is intelligent and is united to the body which has parts like pot etc., (those which have parts are perishable), then the soul will be destroyed along with the body when it decomposes. On the contrary, if the Bhāṭṭas argue that instead of the soul being united to the body, the bodily limbs themselves get united to the soul, then it can be argued that the body has no such power to unite with the soul. Hence, it is clear that a creator must be there to unite both of them. The sprouts coming out of the seeds during rainy season will die during the hot weather and similarly do the created beings

die. Hence the universe is subjected to creation, preservation and dissolution and it is not eternal. Here Arulnandi refers to the impermanent nature of the world.

If the soul is said to be all pervading, according to the Bhāṭṭas, then it cannot follow the paths of virtue, enter *svarga* and come back again (which is contrary to Vedic truth). If the Bhāṭṭas hold that like the smell of flowers tied around the pot the souls pervades the body, then it is implied that along with the body the soul should also decay. Moreover, if the soul is all pervasive, there can be no transmigration. The great ascetics (*yogis*) transmigrate from one body to another. This fact refutes the Mīmāṃsā contention that the self is all-pervasive. The Bhāṭṭas have little understood the *Vedas* and hence such inconsistencies, says Arulnandi.

The actions performed by a person perish along with the disintegration of the body and hence it is difficult to think that the past actions accompany the souls for future births. If the Bhāṭṭas quote the analogy of manure (*i.e.*, just as the plants spread in the land decompose their gross form and benefit the growth of the plants in the field in their subtle form, then the *karmas* at the level of *stūla* disassociates with the body and combines with the soul at the *sūkṣma* level), then it is replied that the food we eat daily has been reduced to excreta and this again can produce food. The actions by themselves cannot identify the soul and join with it since they lose their total vitality in death. To the employees in a firm the employer gives their wages as per the work done by them. In the same way, the gracious Lord unites the *karmas* with the merits and demerits of the actions done by the human souls.

If the Bhāṭṭas declare that one can attain liberation provided one performs the *karmas* in association with *jñāna*, then the very performance of rituals etc., will induce one to desire for acquiring more wealth. Subsequently the soul will be in bondage and its knowledge only

limited (*paśujñāna*) and hence no scope for salvation. As a man is committed to secure wealth and enjoy pleasure, his aspiration to acquire more and more wealth cannot be diminished. Similarly, the more one desires to perform sacrifices etc., to attain heaven, the more one will be entangled in performing rituals.

EVALUATION

According to the Bhaṭṭācāryan School, the *Vedas* are eternal created neither by God nor by human. But Śaivism believes that the *Vedas* are revealed by Śiva. "If other schools hold that the Veda is not revealed, it is because the beings they believe in are not expressly mentioned in the Veda itself as the revealer or they have not ascended to the true idea of God as the revealer of all knowledge out of His Infinite Grace. In any view, it cannot be true that the Veda was self-caused. It must either have a human author or a Divine author and it can only be an euphemism to call it *Svayambu*,"¹ Aruṇāndi clearly shows the untenability of the claim that the *Vedas* are uncaused by pointing out the lack of *pramāṇa* and the method.

While presenting the Bhaṭṭācāryan school, Aruṇāndi in more than one place refers to the term 'ॐ' by which he means liberation from bondage. One may be easily misled by this term to mean *mokṣa* as envisaged by many of the systems of Indian Philosophy. But neither the founder nor the commentator of the *Mīmāṃsā - Sūtra* viewed seriously the concept of *mokṣa*. On the other hand, they insisted on the perfect adherence to the duties enunciated by the *Vedas* mainly to attain happiness in heaven (*svarga*). However, Kumārila and prabhākara developed their own views on the concept of liberation and the means to attain it.

According to Kumārila, liberation must be eternal and it has a negative character. If liberation is conceived of having positive factors like happiness in heaven, then such

a happiness is perishable. Hence liberation must be caused by the destruction of self's allegiance to the world of objects which binds it through the body, sense organs etc. Here Kumāṛila Bhaṭṭa is considering the destruction of the self's relation to the world (*prapañcasambandha vilaya*) and not the cessation of the empirical world itself (*prapañca vilaya*) as held by the Advaitins.

Again, Mīmāṃsā rules out the possibility of *Jīvan mukti* and advocates the doctrine of *Videhamukti*. For the experiences of merit and demerit along with cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, impression etc., would be negated when the destruction of the threefold bondage imposed upon the self by the world takes place. If merit and demerit remain intact, they may cause rebirth together with a body and lead to bondage. Hence their destruction would stop rebirth as well as the production of bodies and thereby remove the possibility of bondage.²

As Arulnandi's prime concern was to show that the *Vedas* have been revealed by Lord Śiva and to refute the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsā that the *Vedas* are eternal, he has not concentrated much on the above interpretation of the concept of liberation.

7

PRABHAKARA SCHOOL

In the commencement of his consideration of Prābhākara system, Aruṇandi makes a note about the founder of Mīmāṃsā viz., Jaimini. He also refers to the two dominant schools of Mīmāṃsā viz., the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara. In the opinion of Aruṇandi, the scripture composed by Jaimini contains the essence of the *Veda* which is for the betterment of mankind. Of the two interpreters of Jaimini's scriptures, Prabhākara and Bhāṭṭācārya, the former differs from the latter in their exposition of Jaimini's texts. After making the above brief preface, Aruṇandi proceeds to consider the Prābhākara School.

Aruṇandi takes up Prabhākara's concept of *apūrva* for consideration. The fruits of the good and bad actions of the past are appropriated to the soul by an unseen potency called *apūrva*. *Mukti*, according to Prabhākara, is a state free from any actions i.e., to be like a motionless statue. These two views are presented as belonging to the Prābhākara school.

REFUTATION

The *Vedas* primarily clarify that the activities performed in the previous births will reproduce varied fruits (in the form of pleasure and pain) in this birth. But the introduction of the concept of *apūrva* by Prabhākara is contrary to the Vedic authority. To say that the fruits of *karmas* are due to *apūrva* and not due to past *karmas* is like saying that the sky flowers obtain their fragrance only

after they are worn on the head. Moreover, the *Vedas* affirm that bliss is liberation. But Prabhākara maintains that the annihilation of intelligence and becoming like a stone and sand is of the nature of liberation. If this is so, then those who have swooned and become unconscious should have attained emancipation. Again, when fire is separated from redness, it ceases to be fire and hotness does not sustain. It is unfair to hold that when the soul's essential attribute *viz.*, intelligence is lost, it enjoys bliss by being like a stone.

EVALUATION

Both Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara believe in the concept of *apūrva* (the unseen potency or 'never before').

According to Kumārila, *apurva* is a capability in the principal action or in the agent, which did not exist prior to the preformance of the action and whose existence is proved by the authority of the scriptures. The positive force created by the act and leading to the attainment of the result is the *apūrva*. Arthāpatti, or implication, proves the existence of *apūrva*. If we do not assume its existence, many Vedic passages become inexplicable. A sacrifice performed by an agent produces directly a certain potency in the agent which resides in him like many other powers throughout life, at the end of which it gains for him the promised reward. According to Prabhākara, *apūrva* cannot be in the self since by its very omnipresence the self is inactive. He does not accept the view that the action tends to produce in the agent a certain faculty, which is the immediate cause of the final result. That the sacrifice produces such a faculty is not proved either by perception, inference or scripture. Action is brought out by the exertion of the agent, and causal

potency must reside in this exertion. So we must assume the faculty in the action and not the agent.”¹

From this, it follows that there is a subtle difference in the meaning of the word ‘*apūrva*’ between Prabhākara and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. This has not been referred to by Aruṇandi.

Aruṇandi states the doctrine of *apūrva* as explained by Prabhākara and refutes it that it stultifies the very basic conception of the *Vedas*. Śankara too criticises the theory of *apūrva* on the ground that it is “non-spiritual”. Aruṇandi has restricted his presentation of Prabhākara only to the concept of *apūrva*, while the latter’s interpretation of the *Jaimini Sūtras* is manifold.

8

SABDA BRAHMAVADA SCHOOL

Arulnandi presents the thoughts of the Śabda Brahmovādin thus: The universe, according to this school, is the deluded aspect of *śabda* (sound). The claim of the ignorant that the meaning is different from sound is meaningless and untrue. Real emancipation is to understand the doctrine that *śabda* is Brahman. The world of objects is a transmigration of the *śabda*. Therefore, the objects of the universe are *śabda* only. If the objects are not identical with the words, how can the words acquire meaning? asks the Śabda Brahmovādin.

Though 'ल' and 'लण' are two different words denoting two objects, they unitedly refer to one and the same object, viz., Lakshmi. Likewise, the word and meaning are in union with each other. Though the primary meaning is *śabda*, it can be expressed through various words and may be variously used to convey or refer to different meanings. This is explained by the analogy of paddy becoming parched i.e., just as the paddy is the womb for the parched rice which may assume different shape and colour, even so, *śabda* is the womb of different words and their meanings.

The Śabda Brahmovādin substantiates his position by the following argument: Since the meaning is understood immediately after the word is uttered, it can be ascertained without doubt that the word itself is identical with its meaning. The Śabda Brahmovādin does not accept the suggestion that the word and its meaning are successive. If

that were the case, it would lead to absurd consequence that the word can exist independent of the meaning which is ridiculous.

REFUTATION

The above contention of the Śabda Brahmovādin with regard to words and meaning is taken for consideration by Aruṇandi. If, according to the Śabda Brahmovādin, all statements are the deluded aspects of the *śabda*, then his statement should also be considered as a delusion. The self-defeating consequences of the argument of the Śabda Brahmovādin is pointed out by Aruṇandi. Moreover, the idea that liberation consists in the realization that the *śabda* constitutes the Vedic conception of salvation is not correct according to Aruṇandi.

The contradiction lies, as has been pointed out by Tattuvappirakāsar, the commentator, in that while according to the *Veda*, liberation can be brought about by *karma* and *jñāna*, the Śabda Brahmovādin maintains that liberation can be brought about by the realization of *śabda*.

If the formless *śabda* gets transformed into the world of objects (forms), then *śabda* will lose its substance having transformed itself into this world. This is like milk becoming curd and the curd becoming the milk once again is an impossibility. Again, the world is an appearance of the Śabda, according to the Śabda Brahmovādin. If the appearance disappears, then there should be only one *śabda*. The one *śabda* cannot be synonymous with the manifold objects. Therefore, it should be understood, says Aruṇandi that the word is merely a sign that indicates the object, but not identical with it. Commenting on this verse (no.214) of Aruṇandi, J.M. Nallasamy Pillai quoting a commentator indicates the fallacy involved in identifying the word with the objects as follows; "If the thing is the Parīṇāma of sound, then when we utter the name 'fire', fire must be produced. If the thing is Vivarta then when we utter the name fire, our tongues must be scorched." Again

he says, "As such the thing cannot be derived from *Śabda* by either mode. The word is a mere symbol or mark (இடு குறிப்பெயர்) by which we have learnt to call the thing."¹

If the word is identical with the meaning, then the word 'அரி' (ari) should have only one meaning. But it is used to denote both Lord Viṣṇu and monkey. Therefore, the meaning of the word is derived from the object it denotes and not identical with the word itself, as held by the Śabda Brahmovādin. Real knowledge consists in knowing that the word refers to an object. Just as the rice cannot become parched one in the absence of fire, word cannot acquire meaning by itself, but only by referring to an object, which is independent of the word itself. Again, real knowledge consists in knowing that each word acquires meaning by virtue of its reference to an object. And only such a knowledge can be beneficial to mankind.

First, we understand the object which is the meaning of the same, according to Aruṇandi. Only latter do we associate the meaning with a word. Hence to hold that the word itself is the meaning is meaningless. Moreover, knowledge arises due to the senses coming into contact with the object when there is consciousness as well as proper light. When this knowledge is represented by a word, meaning comes into being.

When the human soul perceives a thing, the following are required: the object of knowledge, consciousness, the external and internal organs and the light. In such a state the thing and its meaning alone exist devoid of name. As light is necessary to reveal the objects kept in darkness, *śabda* is necessary to know the different objects. The *śabda* is not, therefore, according to Aruṇandi, eternal and cannot be a cause for the object and itself does not become the effect and since it is impermanent, it is subject to destruction. Śabda has been created by Lord Śiva and as such it cannot be God.

EVALUATION

Aruṇandi takes much care in presenting as well as refuting this system of thought. He tries to point out the inconsistencies in the arguments put forth by the Śabda Brahmovādin and establishes the Siddhānta conception of the theory of meaning *viz.*, it is Lord Śiva who has given the meaning to words. It is difficult to determine the origin of meaning to words and hence it has been concluded that the 'origin of language has been lost in the mists of history'. However, Aruṇandi's commitment to theistic trend of thinking, especially the Siddhānta tradition, has paved the way for his conclusion that *śabda* has been created by Lord Śiva.

9

MAYAVADA SCHOOL

Aruṇāṇḍi considers the Advaita system in the name of Māyāvāda. Probably, Advaita might have been known in that name during his time because of its conception of *māyā* as the centrifugal point. In his introduction to the *Brahma Sūtra* Thibaut says, "The doctrine advocated by Śaṅkara is, from a purely philosophical point of view, and apart from all theological considerations, the most important and interesting one which has arisen on Indian soil, neither those forms of Vedānta which diverge from the view represented by Śaṅkara, nor any of the non-Vedāntic systems can be compared with the so called orthodox Vedānta in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation."¹ Contrary to the Mīmāṃsā belief that *karma* as enjoined in the scriptures alone is the means for liberation, Śaṅkara holds that knowledge alone will lead to emancipation while *karma* is subsidiary to *jñāna*. Now let us see the presentation of Māyāvāda by Aruṇāṇḍi.

While introducing the Māyāvāda system, Aruṇāṇḍi identifies the core concepts of that system, *i.e.*, the self is identical with Brahman and the world is illusory like a mirage. After making such introductory remarks, Aruṇāṇḍi says that he is going to consider the system as presented by the Māyāvādin who himself is a product of *māyā*.

According to the Māyāvādin, the following are the descriptions of Brahman: wisdom, the cause of the universe, limitless bliss, formless, omnipresent, eternal, true, pure,

free from all identifications and qualities, the existence of which is testified by the *Vedas* and devoid of the distinction between the knower and the known (*i.e.*, the very fact of experience itself — *Svarūpajñāna*). Just as the one sun is reflected as different forms in the water kept in different vessels, the one Brahman appears to be different in different bodies. The sun can never be caught in the vessels and likewise Brahman transcends the body consciousness and is seldom known by the senses and the intellect. Hence it becomes difficult to comprehend Brahman through the six *pramāṇas*.

In twilight the rope appears as snake and during daylight the delusion vanishes and we perceive a rope as a rope and never as a snake. Likewise the world appears as real due to ignorance, which is ontologically unreal. When *Brahmajñāna* dawns, the reality of Brahman is realized (*i.e.*, the *cit* becomes the *Sat*) and the unreality of the world is understood. The world has its locus the Brahman without which the former cannot come into being. If it is self-existent, it cannot be destroyed. But since it undergoes destruction, its existence must be due to falsity (*mithyā*). Just as a shell which is mistaken for silver is burnt to ashes, the world which is mistaken for real will eventually be sublated in the *pāramārthika*.

According to Arulnandi, the Māyāvādin holds that the material cause of the supported world is *Sat*. As the spider produces the thread from itself to form into a web and takes it back into itself, Brahman produces the world, sustains it and finally resolves it so that the world becomes unreal again. Hence the essence of the universe is *Sat*.

Now, the author proceeds to present the components of the universe and how do they evolve from Brahman. From the pure Brahman originated the sky; from sky, air; from air, fire; from fire, water; from water, earth and from these elements, plants; from plants, food; and from food the body and its six substances such as skin, bone, nerve etc.

Aruṇandi refers to the five sheeths that envelope the self. They are:

- (i) the outermost and the grossest sheeth viz., *annamaya kośa*, constituted by the six substances,
- (ii) the *prāṇamaya kośa*, the sheeth of vital air,
- (iii) the *manomaya kośa*, the sheeth of mind,
- (iv) the *vijñānamaya kośa*, the sheeth of the intellect and
- (v) the *ānandamaya kośa*, the innermost and the subtlest, i.e., the sheeth of bliss.

Just as the sun is not affected by its different reflections in different waterpots, the Brahman is unaffected by its reflections on different selves and hence it is beyond all attachments. As the single thread strung through the beads of various colours appears as multi-coloured, Brahman also appears, as different beings. Even as the thread remains the same throughout, Brahman also remains the same despite the enjoyment of the individual beings.

People due to devotion call the nameless Brahman with a number of names and Brahman which is one appears to be many because of its union with different bodies and experiences pleasures, pain, etc. The enjoyment (*avasthā*) is four in kind *jāgrat*, *svapna*, *suṣupti* and *turiya*. In the *jāgratāvasta* the fourteen organs which include five motor organs, five sense organs and four internal organs are in function. In the *svapnāvasthā* only the four *antaḥkaraṇas* are in function. In *suṣupti* or in deep sleep state only *citta* is in function. *Turiya* is a state where the functions of all the instruments are transcended. Bondage arises due to the wrong identification of the self with the instruments of knowledge. When this false identification is destroyed, liberation is attained. When *avidyā* is destroyed, *māyā* together with its products is annihilated. At this stage wisdom (*jñāna*) dawns and the non-differentiating knowledge of Brahman arises.

The systematic practice of the prescribed *karmas* makes the *antaḥkaraṇas* pure. Subsequently purification brings forth *jñāna* and *jñāna* enlightens that "I am Brahman". Even as the moon's reflection is seen in stagnant water, one can perceive the self in *māyā* when one realizes that "I am Brahman". Knowledge of Brahman consists in the realization of one's self as Brahman and becoming Brahman is a stage in which one experiences Brahman in one's self. When body, *karaṇas*, *prāṇa*, etc., lose their name and form and when the elements are destroyed and the self remains unchanged, the knowledge of Brahman is attained. We have to realize the truth of the great statements (*mahāvākyas*) such as *tattvamasī* etc., enunciated in the *Vedas*. They teach us no other truth than the basic idea 'thou art Brahman'. Those who do not understand this basic truth engage themselves in the five kinds of *āsanas* (postures) and eight kinds of *yoga* like *yama*, *niyama* etc., in order to attain liberation.

REFUTATION

After presenting the Māyāvāda in the aforesaid manner, Aruṇāndi refutes this system as follows:

The statement of the Māyāvādin is confusing when he says that the only reality is non-dual Brahman and that is identical with 'I'. According to the Māyāvādin, *mukti* consists in realizing oneself, as Brahman. The *sohambhāvana*, elucidated by the Māyāvādin, does not explain the concept of *mukti*. For the statement 'I have become that' has two interpretations *viz.*, one who enjoys and the enjoyment. Wrongly it is stated that the immutable Brahman becomes the *jīvas*, by getting into its fold, *karma* etc. This view is like the statement that a barren crow has fed its young ones with a piece of stony flesh to satisfy their hunger and thirsty. According to this analogy, the *nirvikalpa* Brahman is the barren crow; the *jīvātman*, the young ones; and *karmas* etc., the stony flesh. Thirst and hunger symbolize the quest for liberation.

The Māyāvādin says that the eternal *Vedas* definitely hold that Brahman is the only Reality. If so, argues the Siddhāntin, the same *Vedas* speak about *tripuṭi jñāna* i.e., *jñātīru* (knower), *jñāna*, (knowledge) and *jñeyā* (objects of knowledge) that contradict the original statement that reality is one without a second. There is no consistency in the Vedic statements such as *ahambrahmāsmi* and *tattvamasi* etc., If interpreted in the way of the Māyāvādin, there can be no distinction between the knower and the known in the state of liberation. That means there will be no knowledge and hence no mystic experience. The analogy expounded by the Māyāvādin to enunciate the first principle as one only like the sun reflected in the vessels of water is untenable. For Brahman is formless (*arūpa*) and it cannot find a place in the body which has form (*rūpa*). Moreover, when the vessel is kept in shadow no reflection of the sun can be seen. Likewise, there should be body devoid of Brahman. But even as a person looks at the sun in a vessel there is a soul to witness Brahman in the body. Therefore there is no substance in the statements like *ahambrahmāsmi*.

The indwelling spirit in the body could understand only in conjunction with the five senses and the mind. The scriptures too endorse this view. But the Māyāvādin upholds the view that the One Brahman in union with the body knows by itself without the aids of the senses and the mind which is like the assertion of the existence of hare's horn. The distinction between the supreme self and the individual self should be acknowledged. The Māyāvādin's statement that there is only one reality viz., Brahman is untenable. The Māyāvādin maintains that reality is one like the ruby and its effulgence. Here the concept of oneness is being destroyed. For, the existing ruby and its effulgence are related as *guṇi* and *guṇa* i.e., substance and attribute. If the Māyāvādin states that there is one reality, this world which is unequal with Brahman has nothing to contribute to the Brahman and there will be no feeling either. The Māyāvādin should understand the above said absurd

consequence of his position. Even as mistaking a rope for a snake in twilight, one mistakes the universe as real which is really an appearance, says the Māyāvādin. In that case the deluded persons must also be the transfiguration of Brahman. Then, only deluded knowledge will arise and there will be no scope for divine bliss to be experienced.

According to the Māyāvādin, the world is neither *sat* nor *asat* (*anirvacanīyam*). If that were the case, can any one speak of the world to have existence and non-existence at the same time? asks the Siddhāntin. If the world has an origin, then it must exist. If it does not exist, it will never come into existence. When we speak of the non-existence of the world, we simply refer to its resolution into its invisible primordial cause. If both Brahman and the world are qualitatively different from each other, there is no question of Brahman transforming itself into the world and hence the distinction between *vyavahārika* and *pāramārtika* is untenable because there will be only one Brahman.

The Māyāvādin holds that the unreal world coming into existence out of Brahman is like the threads coming out of the spider. From this analogy it follows that Brahman is both material and efficient cause. The Siddhāntin argues how the material which is *acit* could have been evolved from Brahman which is *cit*. The Māyāvādin may reply that though Brahman is the cause of the world, it cannot be identified with the world. The argument, according to Aruṇandi, is untenable because in the production of a pot, it cannot produce itself from the clay, but requires three distinct causes, *viz.*, efficient, material and auxiliary causes. When these three causes obtain, the world is produced like a pot. It is also to be noted that these three causes are independent of one another.

The Māyāvādin claims that Brahman, the supreme Being, manifests in different bodies. If so, then how are we to account for the unconscious states of the bodies when they are in dream and sleep, or in the deceased states? If

it is explained by the Māyāvādin that vital air, mind and other *karmas* are not active during those states, then it must be understood, according to Aruṇandi, that either Brahman becomes non-intelligent at times or even in its presence the senses become inactive.

According to the Māyāvādin, liberation consists in detaching oneself from the bodily attachments. But, on the contrary, one shudders at the very thought of leaving the body even though one has suffered the evils of old age and disease. There could be no fear of leaving the body if the Māyāvādin's contention that leaving the body leads to freedom. Therefore Aruṇandi says that eventhough the body is non-different from Brahman, it is different from the Brahman. The Māyāvādin speaks of the beads strung on one string. Here the beads are many and woven in one string. This analogy is correct in the sense that Brahman is one undifferentiated while the world is differentiated and many, *i.e.*, the world is changing, while Brahman is unchangeable. This doctrine does away with the theory of *abhedavāda*. This implies that Brahman is different from the world. Hence the *abhedavāda* of Māyāvādin is unacceptable according to Aruṇandi.

According to the Māyāvādin, the self in conjunction with the body undergoes the experiences of pleasure and pain. But he contradicts himself when he says that pleasure and pain do not pertain to the self. If the Māyāvādin replies that pleasure and pain belong to the *jīva* and not to the self as such, the Siddhāntin questions how the supreme self which is beyond the grasp of mind and speech can become the *jīva*?

The Māyāvādin holds that the Brahman pervades all the *jīvas*. If this is true, the *jīva* cannot be subjected to the *avasthās*. The Māyāvādin may reply that it is not the self, but the *antaḥkaraṇas* which undergo the *avasthās*. If that is the case, then the *jīva* should be held responsible for the activity of the *antaḥkaraṇas*. To this the Māyāvādin may

reply that the activity of the *antaḥkaraṇas* is not due to the active agency of the *jīva*. He may explain this fact by an analogy of iron's movement in the proximity of the magnet. But Arulnandi argues that from the analogy it would follow that like the iron which gets attached to the magnet cannot separate itself from the latter, the *antaḥkaraṇas* cannot leave the self; but externally attached to the self. Therefore, the Māyāvādin's conception of Brahman that it is essentially free from the *antaḥkaraṇas* becomes untenable.

Even as the sun is veiled by darkness, Brahman is veiled by ignorance, mistaking its body and senses as itself. To say that the soul after leaving the ignorant body attains knowledge, that it is the same as Brahman and enters *mokṣa* wherein it becomes itself the only existence, is ridiculous. For it would imply that pure Brahman (*amala*) is ridden by impurity (*mala*). Purity is an eternal and essential attribute of Brahman and not an accidental quality. If impurity is ascribed to the soul which, according to the Māyāvādin, is none other than Brahman, then in consequence impurity is imputed to Brahman too. These contradictions arise, according to Arulnandi, because the Māyāvādin does not understand clearly the nature of the soul, impurity, *karma* and *māyā* and the first cause, the Supreme Being. The Māyāvādin says that even as fire latent in firewood gets manifested later, the *jīva* latent in the body manifests itself as Brahman. But Arulnandi says that fire has been divided into two as concealed in the wood and manifested. Similarly the *jīva* is also different from Brahman *i.e.*, duality persists between the Supreme Soul and the individual soul.

When one speaks that he experiences as himself, duality persists here too for there is a perceiver and the perceived. If there is only one, as maintained by the Māyāvādin, then one cannot even say that there is one Brahman. If the Māyāvādin says that *mokṣa* is merely the annihilation of

ignorance, even then sentience will be present. If this is derived from and attributed to *māyā*, then Brahman too will be affected by *māyā* and be, therefore, subject to destruction. The Māyāvādin does not know the real import of the Vedic statements (*Mahāvākhyas*) like *tattvamasi* (thou art that). It only means that the self is non-different from the Supreme Self and it does not mean that they are one. This is the real import of the Vedic statement according to Aruṇānandī. This import of the statement which is beyond the comprehension of Lord Viṣṇu and Brahmā can be known by those who attain the grace of Lord Śiva, the Lord Almighty. To attain the grace of the Lord, however, the *sādhana*s like *yoga* and *jñāna* will be of immense use.

EVALUATION

The presentation of the Māyāvāda system by Aruṇānandī is quite remarkable and objective in the sense that he takes into account of the cardinal principles of the system. The quintessence of the Advaita Vedānta is quite objectively presented. In his reflection of the system, Aruṇānandī points out the logical inconsistencies among the various concepts like Brahman, *jīva*, *māyā*, bondage and liberation. Aruṇānandī just works out the implications of Māyāvādin's own position and quite effectively shows the inconsistency of the consequence with the premises.

10

BHASKARA SCHOOL

Bhāskara, who flourished in 900A.D after Śankara, criticises the fundamental philosophical doctrines of Advaita Vedānta propounded by Śankara. According to him, Śankara is a crypto-Buddhist. Śankara's interpretation of the *Brahma Sūtra* leads to non-dualistic trends whereas Bhāskara subscribes to the *bhedābheda* i.e., Brahman is non-different as the cause of the world who is also different as the effect or the manifest world. The individual self is also both different as well as non-different, which is a real part of Brahman. Its difference is conditional while non-difference is essential. According to Bhāskara, liberation consists in the combination of action and knowledge (*jñāna-karma samuccayavāda*). Nimbārka, Vallabha and Jīva Gosvāmi followed Bhāskara in interpreting the *Brahma Sūtra* in terms of the doctrine of difference and identity.

Bhāskara's commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra*, known as *Bhāskarabhāṣya*, does not favour either Śankara Advaita or Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja. The view of Bhāskara is understood as *bhedābheda* or the doctrine that unity and multiplicity are equally real. Brahman as cause is one; identical and the casual state is one of unity, while as effects, it is many, different and the manifested state is one of multiplicity. Bhāskara emphasises on real modification (*pariṇāma*) of Brahman.

Aruṇandi introduces Bhāskara school by saying that this system is different from that of the Māyāvādin with

reference to the interpretation of the purport of the *Vedas*. According to Bhāskara, the purport of the *Vedas* is that Reality is one of identity-in-difference while that of the Māyāvādin is one of identity. After such an introductory remark, Aruṇandi proceeds to state Bhāskara system as follows: Everything including the *jīva* is real because they are the manifestations of the *Cit* (Brahman). In the state of release, the *jīvas* will be freed from the limiting adjuncts and become identical with Brahman. This is the essence of the teachings of the *Vedas*.

REFUTATION

The world cannot evolve from the *Cit* or Brahman as held by Bhāskara, since the material world is *acit*. To hold that the world has evolved from the *Cit* is like confusing knowledge with the object of knowledge. If Bhāskara says that the identity of Brahman and the world is like that of salt and water, then Aruṇandi replies that the saltiness of water is not the essential quality of water, but acquires due to its association with earth. This means that salt is different from water and not manifested from water. Moreover, if a part of the Brahman became the world, then that part of the Brahman is subject to destruction. Since it is subject to destruction, it cannot be *Cit*, but only *acit*. This is a contradiction. It implies that a part of Brahman which is *Cit* becomes *acit*. Therefore, the contention of Bhāskara cannot be accepted according to Aruṇandi.

If it is held, on the contrary, that the whole Brahman transformed itself into the world, like a seed becoming a tree without reminder, then there is no meaning in attributing eternity to the Brahman. Thus Aruṇandi points out the logical inconsistency of the Parīṇāmavāda. Further, for a seed to grow into a tree, it needs the support and sustenance of the earth. If it is held that Brahman evolved into the world, what is the support for the Brahman?, asks Aruṇandi.

Just as bracelet, armlet, ring, ear-ring, chain, necklace etc., are produced from gold, the world and its products are the manifestations of Brahman according to Bhāskara. To this contention of the Pariṇāmavādin the Siddhāntin replies that a goldsmith is necessary to produce ornaments from gold and persons to wear them. In the same way a person must be there to create this world and persons for whom this world is to be created.

According to Bhāskara, liberation can be attained through knowledge and action. Both knowledge and action are possible for the embodied souls. By contradicting this belief, Bhāskara holds that liberation is possible only after knowledge and action are relinquished. The contradiction between the means and the end are well brought out by Aruṇandi.

EVALUATION

Aruṇandi sharply reacts to the contention of Bhāskara that the object of knowledge as such are qualitatively different from each other. He substantiates that Brahman cannot manifest as the world because the Supreme Being would be subjected to origin and decay, since Brahman is the sole cause of creation and destruction of the universe. Bhāskara insists on the combination of action and knowledge (*jñāna karma samuccaya*) for the attainment of liberation. The *jīvas* are nothing but Brahman in its limited condition which really suffer the miseries of the material world. However, Aruṇandi points out the difficulties involved in the conception of means and end.

11

NIRISVARA SANKHYA SCHOOL

The Sāṅkhya system of Kapila subscribes to the theory of atomistic pluralism and sets aside the traditional belief that God has created the world. It rather substitutes the theory of evolution for creation. The author of the *Śarva Darśana Saṁgraha* brings out the philosophy of this school concisely that it maintains four several kinds of existence. They are as follows: (a) evolvent, (b) that which is both evolute and evolvent, (c) that which is evolute and (d) that which is neither. The evolvent is the root of all the effects and hence it is the 'great one.' Since it evolves, it is known as the evolvent (*prakṛti*) which has the equilibrium of the three qualities (*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*). The second *viz.*, the evolutes and evolvents are understood in terms of egoism and subtle elements. The third, evolute only means five gross elements, ether etc., and the eleven organs. Finally, the soul is neither evolvent nor evolute, but it is absolute, eternal and subject to no development.'

Aruṇāndi explains the philosophical tenets of this school in a single verse thus: Among *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, *prakṛti* divides itself into *mūlam* (root), *puriyattakam* (subtle body) and *vikṛti* (gross body as well as the universe) and exists as *sthūlam sūkṣmam* and *param*. The *puruṣa*, initially when associated with the *prakṛti* wrongly thinks that he is one with it. But when enlightenment comes, the *puruṣa* realizes that everything belongs to *prakṛti* and it leaves *prakṛti* and attains liberation.

REFUTATION

If the *puruṣa* has pure intelligence as its true nature, *prakṛti* can never envelope it. So bondage is unintelligible on the basis of the Sāṅkhya dualism. But since the Sāṅkhya has accepted bondage of the *puruṣa* by the *prakṛti*, there is no guarantee that there will be liberation, as the liberated soul can at any time be bound by the *prakṛti* once again.

According to the Sāṅkhya, liberation consists in passively witnessing the malignant *prakṛti*. Unless the *puruṣa* witnesses passively the *prakṛti*, there can be no liberation. This contention of the Sāṅkhya is countered by Aruṇandi according to whom there can be no *prakṛti* to be witnessed by a liberated *puruṣa*. Hence the question of witnessing the *prakṛti* does not arise. When the *puruṣa* is united to *prakṛti*, the former's intelligence diminishes a little and thereby he becomes lame. Even as a lame man seated on the back of the blind man guides the latter, *puruṣa* guides the dark *prakṛti*, and eats the fruits thereof. However, this is impossible in the absence of an Almighty (Śiva) according to Aruṇandi. The Almighty is one who is required to unite and guide the blind and the lame *viz.*, *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. It is interesting here to note that Aruṇandi establishes the Śaivite view point by working out the implications of the Sāṅkhya metaphysics.

The *puruṣa* by itself is not self-luminous and the *prakṛti* is non-intelligent. There must be a first cause to evolve these two. If liberation, according to Sāṅkhya, is the separation of *puruṣa* from the *prakṛti*, then it is difficult to attain release. Neither *pāśa* nor the soul can bring about liberation. The Lord who brought about the union between the two is required to shower His grace to separate the two in order to liberate the soul. Following the prescribed path one has to earn the grace of the Lord for liberation.

EVALUATION

As the Sāṅkhya system of Kapila rejects theistic trends and advocates spiritualistic pluralism as well as atheistic realism, it is known by the name *nirīśvara Sāṅkhya* system. Also this school of thought maintains an uncompromising dualism, *i.e.*, dualism persists between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*. Like the Śaiva Siddhānta, Sāṅkhya upholds the theory of *satkāryavāda* as far as the theory of causation is concerned. But the former insists on the intelligent principle for creation, *viz.*, Śiva while the latter holds that the world evolves from the *mūlaprakṛti* due to the identification of the *puruṣa*. The Siddhāntin is committed to theism and he subscribes to the divine grace which is responsible for creation while matter which is inert and unintelligent cannot manifest into other things by itself.

Aruṇandi has well brought out the gist of the Sāṅkhya system and has refuted it with relevant arguments. Though there are several blunders in the order of categories, *viz.*, *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* as absolute and independent entities, the Sāṅkhya system has well explained the theory of evolution in terms of twenty four *tattvas*. These twenty four categories are accepted by the Siddhāntins besides their own twelve additional *tattvas*. Aruṇandi has not mentioned the process of evolution and the three *guṇas* of *prakṛti* anywhere in his treatment. Aruṇandi's contention that there will be no *prakṛti* to be witnessed by the liberated *puruṣa* fails to take into account the realistic metaphysics of the Sāṅkhya System according to which both *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* are ontologically real.

12

THE PANCARATRA SCHOOL

The Pāñcarātra school has been explained by Aruṇānandi thus: Māyan, the Lord Mahāviṣṇu who is the Beginning, the Formless, the Omnipresent, the Effulgence of Wisdom has taken many births out of His own free will to redeem the souls. Out of His abundant grace He performs *yoganirṭa* (divine slumber), on the vast ocean (of milk) and from there He has revealed the sacred texts.

The Lord of *Paramaṣadham* (the sacred abode) has produced Brahmā (அபரன்) from His navel and Brahmā created the world and to dissolve the world Viṣṇu has created Haran (அரன்) and He becomes the custodian of the world to preserve it. He does the triple activities of creation, preservation and destruction. Further, the Pāñcarātri states that Lord Mahāviṣṇu, out of His bounteous grace, incarnated Himself in this world as the Fish, the Tortoise, the Boar, the Man-Lion, the Vāmana, Paraśurāma, Rāmā, Balarāmā and Kṛiṣṇā. He is yet to incarnate as Kalki and He is the Lord of all celestials (தேவர்கோன்).

The Lord as the Fish had borne the seven oceans in his gill, as the Tortoise shouldered the great mountain (*Mahāmeru*), as the Boar lifted the submerged earth, as the Lion (*Narasimha*) slew Irāṇyan (the demon), as Vāmanan measured the earth and heaven, as Paraśurāman, Śrī Rāman and Balarāman became the king of kings and destroyed the wiles of the aśuras and protected the earth from peril. He is yet to come as a horse to preserve the

prapañcam the (universe) during the time of deluge. When an elephant was caught between the teeth of a crocodile, it shouted for mercy by crying out 'O my father', 'O my Lord', 'O the first cause'. The Lord, whom we adore for our salvation, instantly rushed for its succour and not only did He save the elephant but also did grant salvation to both the animals.

The Pāñcarātrin also says that His Lord churned the ocean and offered ambrosia to the celestials, destroyed the *aśuras* in order to save the souls in several worlds. Also He elucidated the meaning of the scriptures to His devotees out of His grace and thus stands as the Supreme Lord. The Lord (Māyan) while creating the universe became the embodiment of *māyā*, the *Īva*, and the product of *māyā*. He bound the mortals through *māyā* and but for His grace *māyā* can never be rooted out. One should realize this fact and should worship Him. Then *māyā* will vanish and consequently will one be granted salvation and will find a place in the Vaikuṇṭham (sacred abode of Viṣṇu).

REFUTATION

The *Vedas* declare, says Arulnandi, that the creator is one who has neither a beginning nor an end. So the contention of the Pāñcarātrin that Mahāviṣṇu is the beginning of the universe is untenable since anything which has a beginning should have an end also. If He is the Effulgence and Wisdom, then He cannot be caught into the folds of *māyā* and become the embodiment of *māyā*. If the Pāñcarātrin argues that the embodiments of Mahāviṣṇu are due to His unblemished wisdom, then His bodies would not have the constituent elements. But His bodies have such constituent elements which are perishable and hence He cannot be the creator of this universe.

To the question how could Viṣṇu possess the elements of the human body (like flesh, blood etc.) the Siddhāntin replies that Śaṅkara (Śiva) went as a beggar to receive the sacrificial food and the bowl for alms was not filled up.

Viṣṇu, out of pride, opened His nerve between the eyebrows. Blood came out in plenty and from the loss of which he swooned. It was Lord Śiva who saved Him from his fainted state. The Lord who dwells in the ocean walked behind Lord Śiva.

If Hari (Viṣṇu) could assume any form out of His own will, then it is asked why did He not produce His own head when His head was lost due to the fierce act of Vīrabhadra? The story goes thus: In the sacrificial rite performed by Dakṣa where Paramēśvara was ignored and Paramēśvari was ill-treated, Mahāviṣṇu participated as *Yagñamūrti*. When Vīrabhadra, Śiva's attendant, attacked and cut off His head, He could not create His own head again. Lord Śiva granted Him His head out of His grace and at the entreaty of His devotees. When this being the case, how can we be certain that Viṣṇu could take His own forms desired by Himself?

The Pāñcarātrin claims that Tirumāl gave out the *Vedas* and clarified their meaning. But, according to Aruṇandi, as people were ignorant of the *Vedas*, Lord Śiva, revealed the Vedic texts with their interpretative accounts from under the banyan tree. So He is the genuine author of the *Vedas*, *Āgamas* and *Purāṇas*. Again, the Pāñcarātrin holds that Viṣṇu begot Brahmā (Ayan) But when Lord Śiva plucked away the fifth head of Brahmā, Viṣṇu was a mute witness and He could not fearlessly create a head afresh. Hence it is improper to hold that this Brahmā begot Rudra. Aruṇandi says that the Pāñcarātrin should understand without mistake that every act is according to the will of Lord Śiva.

The Pāñcarātrin asserts that Viṣṇu incarnated Himself to sustain the universe. But Aruṇandi holds that Tirumāl (Viṣṇu) came out of the womb like other mortal beings. Brahmā, who is said to be born to Viṣṇu, was unable to create the world after the great deluge. He prayed to Lord Śiva and the latter made His presence in

the forehead of the former. All the *purāṇas* narrate such incidents and hence it is clear that Paramēśvara was not a creation of Brahmā. Moreover, Aruṇandi says that Nārāyaṇā created Brahmā and Brahmā created Nārāyaṇā and thus each is the cause of the other. But there is an ultimate cause for both of them *i.e.*, Lord Śiva who has skinned off the elephant as envisaged by the *Vedas*. As Paramēśvaran is the first cause, Viṣṇu occupies the right side and Brahmā the left side of Lord Śiva.

According to the Pāñcarātrin, the world is destroyed by the fiat of Mahāviṣṇu. But during dissolution even Brahmā and Viṣṇu will be destroyed and Viṣṇu cannot prevent Himself from death. The relics of Viṣṇu's frequent deaths are worn by Śiva. Hence it is obvious that *samhāra* is due to the command of Viṣṇu is also meaningless. As *samhāra* is performed by Paramēśvara, He alone could create and protect the world. Again, the Pāñcarātrin maintains that the entire universe comprising of earth and heaven is protected by Viṣṇu. But on an occasion, Aruṇandi, says, when the demon Jalandara threatened Viṣṇu, the latter was frightened and did penance towards Śiva. Śiva had cloven the body of the demon Jalandara with a discus who came to disturb the penance of Viṣṇu. Then Viṣṇu after repeated requests obtained the discus from Lord Śiva and protected the world from the endangering demons. This episode is spoken throughout the *purāṇas*. Hence to say that Viṣṇu preserves the universe is nothing more than to say that Śiva preserves through Viṣṇu.

Aruṇandi further holds that during *pralaya* Mahāviṣṇu incarnated as a fish to preserve the universe and controlled all the seven oceans in its gills. He got pride over His achievement and declared that He was the Lord of *Samhāra*. Lord Śiva who wanted to curb the egoism of Viṣṇu speared the fish and severed its gills and eyes and put them on the trident as an ornament. When Viṣṇu assumed the form of a tortoise to shoulder the mountain Meru, he was puffed with pride that He was the supporter

of the universe. Lord Śiva neither endorsed nor denied the claim of the tortoise. But He broke the tortoise open and put on the shell as an ornament to His body along with other skulls.

Mahāviṣṇu incarnated as a boar and cleaved through the seven worlds and kept them on His tusk. Then He was self-conceited that He was the only adorable Light of the Universe. Lord Śiva, who is fond of dancing in the graveyard, tore off the boar's tusk and wore its skull. Again, when Hiraṇya asked Prahalātha whether the latter could show his Lord in the pillar and struck it with his foot, Viṣṇu appeared in the form of Narasimha and killed Hiraṇya. As a result, Narasimha was filled with ego-centrism and claimed superiority over other celestials as the creator. Śiva assumed the form a bird (*simbul*, *sarabha* — a fabulous eight-legged bird) and easily controlled Narasimha by subduing His dominating attitude.

Once Mahāviṣṇu came to the earth as Vāmana and begged king Mahāpali for charity. The king offered three feet of land as required by Vāmana. The Lord acquired the earth and heaven with His two feet and found no place for His third foot. He got wild and imprisoned Mahāpali and hence Viṣṇu cannot be a true Master. For, if one offers a gift, the recipients should be grateful towards the benefactors and should not harm them. During Rāmāvatāra, Rāvaṇa sent an illusory deer to abduct Sītā, the wife of Rāmā. Without knowing this treacherous plot, Rāmā followed the deceitful creature and lost his wife. The Pāñcarātrin calls such an ignorant person as the creator. Since Mahālakṣmi left Him, bewildered was He and brutally killed Rāvaṇa and his troops at Śrīlanka. To purge himself from the vice (sin of killing), Rāmā worshipped Śiva (at Rāmēśvaram) and got rid of his *karmas*.

At one time Viṣṇu was born with an axe (*paraśu*) and was known thenceforth as Parasurāman. As a devotee to Paramēśvara, he again performed austere penance of

annihilate his sinfulness caused by killing several kings. Balarāmā too reigned his domain by remaining in yogic contemplation and meditation on Lord Śiva who has been adored world over. Aruṇandi requests the Pāñcarātrin that he should know that when sage Upamanyu was moving towards mount Kailas, the dwelling place of Lord Śiva, Vāsudeva (Lord Kṛishṇa) at Dvārakāpuri requested the sage to initiate him into the worship of Śiva. Willingly the sage looked at Him graciously and touched His head with his hand and made Him a vassal of Paramēśvara. The enlightened Vāsudeva dedicated his body, soul and wealth to the service of His master and became a staunch devotee of Lord Śiva.

In the forthcoming era Viṣṇu has to incarnate as a horse, according to the Pāñcarātrin. But Aruṇandi says that if Viṣṇu does so, then none can predict what may befall Him from Lord Śiva. For everyone will be aware of what had happened in the previous incarnations. It is to be realized that the glory of Śiva, whose crown is adorned with *konrai*, flowers, is known far and wide. Further, can Viṣṇu be considered as the creator who lifted the mountain to protect the cowered and who annihilated the melancholy of an elephant by killing the crocodile? When a citizen launches a complaint towards the king, is it not fair on the part of the king to go in person to inquire and render justice? Just as the village guard eradicates the evils in obedience to the orders of the king, Viṣṇu protects the universe according to the commands of Paramēśvara. Again, just because the agonised elephant cried '*Ādhi-mūlam*' (the First Cause), can Viṣṇu become the Primal Lord of creation? If a slave adores his master 'My Lord' can the master claim himself to be Viṣṇu?

The Pāñcarātrin claims that their Lord had swallowed the earth and because of His grace the devas partook the ambrosia. The Siddhāntin points out that when the dreadful poison arose from the ocean, the devas including

Mahāviṣṇu approached Śiva and begged for His grace to save them all from mortality.

If Śiva, out of His abundant grace had not swallowed the poison, how could the devas and Viṣṇu have survived and tasted the nectar? Further, as Viṣṇu was afraid of Sūrapadman, the asura, He left the milky ocean and sought refuge under Lord Śiva. Lord Śiva created Lord Kumaran and the latter killed the asura. When the devas including Mahāviṣṇu complained about the treacherous deeds of Tārakāśura, Lord Śiva sent Kālī, His consort, and assassinated him. When the three asuras troubled the devas, the devas along with Viṣṇu requested Lord Śiva to save them from the atrocities of the asuras. Lord Śiva obligingly burnt the three cities of the asuras and killed them. When the asura, Jalandaran drove away Mahāviṣṇu from His ocean of milk, Śiva slew the former with the discus as requested by Mahāviṣṇu. Lord Śiva saved the universe from peril by taking the poison which affected all the fourteen worlds. Thus these incidents show how Lord Śiva did protect the universe.

Arjuna (Pārthan) on looking at his enemies from his chariot, declined to fight, since they were his kinsmen. He did not want to slain them and rule his kingdom. But his charioteer Lord Kriṣṇa pacified him with wily words and induced him to fight, (That is, not Arujna, but only Kriṣṇa was killing). Such utterances of the Lord have been regarded as sacred scriptures by the Pāñcarātrins. Then, says Aruṇandi, the faulty statements of the Buddha (Mahaviṣṇu's *avatāra*) can also be treated as a holy text.

Aruṇandi asserts that since *māyā* is inactive (*jaḍā*), it can never become the souls; nor the souls become *māyā* since they have activities like *iccā*, *kriyā* and *jñānā*. Mahāviṣṇu was regarded as the embodiment of wisdom (*jñāna svarūpi*) by the Pāñcarātrin. But he cannot become the *māyā* as well as the soul, nor the latter constitute

Mahāviṣṇu. These categories viz., *pāsā* (bonds), *paśu* (soul) and *Pati* (the Lord) are eternal. The omnipresent Lord who is Perfect appears as everything and He cannot become these. The *Āgamas* declare that when the souls relinquish the impurities and unite with *Pati*, liberation is attained. But the Pāñcarātrin holds that the immaculate Mahāviṣṇu will become the ignorant soul. The defective works contrary to the *Vedāgamas* are followed by the Pāñcarātrin. Wise people would not accept such defective works and interpret their import.

When Brahmā and Mahāviṣṇu proclaimed their superiority over each other as the Supreme Brahman, Lord Śiva who intended to curtail their egoism stood as a pillar of flaming fire in their midst. Neither of the deities could see either His Foot or Head. Mahāviṣṇu who holds the *cakra* (discus) in his hand and who could not realize the real nature of Śiva cannot be a real creator.

In the combat between Mahāviṣṇu and Tateesi, a Śaivite saint, the latter caught the former, kicked Him on His chest, broke the discus and created one afresh and threw Him away in a swooned condition. Hence, Aruṇandi asserts that the Lord with a trident is the true God and not Tirumāl. Sage Durvāsar, a devotee of Lord Śiva got wild and kicked Mahāviṣṇu on His chest. As a result, there was a scar on His chest and He has been called *Tirumaṣumārban* (He with the sacred scar on his chest). The Lord dwelling at the Milky Ocean willingly kept Mahālakṣmi there since He considered that place a sacred one which was being touched by a devotee.

Once Mahāviṣṇu intended to have sexual intercourse with Tīvi in the absence of her husband, sage Br̥hu. Since she did not yield to His request, the agitated Mahāviṣṇu made the marks of violence on her body. When the sage found those marks got wild and swore on the intensity of his true love to Śiva that the ignoble Mahāviṣṇu who violated the chastity of women should undergo ten evil births.

Mahāviṣṇu on listening to the curse of the sage fell down with fear and anguish. The aggrieved Mahāviṣṇu performed penance towards Lord Śiva. Śiva appeared before Him and asked Him what He wanted. Mahāviṣṇu requested Lord Śiva to save Him from the curse of Sage Bṛhu. Śiva replied that Bṛhu was His staunch devotee and He could not interfere. Mahāviṣṇu persistently adored the Lord and made an appeal to redeem Him at each of His births. Lord Śiva promised Him to do so accordingly.

He cannot be the pure God (*nirmalan*) who was born ten times due to the curse of Sage Bṛhu and suffered throughout. Viṣṇu is not the God to bestow release to the souls. The aspirant for liberation should adore the Holy Feet of the Blue — Throated Śiva (Neelakaṇḍan), the Lord Supreme.

EVALUATION

Following the lead of J. M. Nallasamy Pillai we can also state that "It may be distinctly understood that we do not want to open any sectarian controversy on the subject matter of this chapter. We would fain have omitted it altogether but it would spoil the completeness of the work under translation."¹

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. Subramanian, S.V., (Ed.), *Śivajñāna Māpādiyam* (Madras: International Institute of Tamil Studies, 1986), pp. 38-39.
2. *Śivajñānabodham*, அவையடக்கம் “Śaiva Siddhānta”, Vajra-velu Mudaliar in *Collected Lectures on Śaiva Siddhānta* (Annamalai Nagar: Annamalai University, 1965), p. 10.
3. *Śaiva Siddhānta* (Madras: University of Madras, 1960), pp. 72-73.
4. *Śaiva Siddhānta* (London: Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 115.
5. Devasenapathi, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

Chapter 2

1. *The Śarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha*, (Varanasi: The Chowkamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1961), p. 2.
2. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), p. 79.
3. *The Śarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
4. The six kinds of perception stated by Aruṇāndi are enumerated by the commentator as follows:
 - (i) *Ayyakkāṭci* - doubtful perception - purely mental *e.g.*, doubtfully perceiving a thing either as a rope or snake.
 - (ii) *Vāyirkāṭci* - perception by means of the five senses.
 - (iii) *Vikarṇpakāṭci* - perception of a thing in its relation to class, species and attributes, and actions.
 - (iv) *Anvayakkāṭci* - perceiving one thing from the other things *e.g.*, perception of fire by the presence of smoke.
 - (v) *Vyatirekakkaṭci* - perceiving a visible object from the invisible things, *e.g.*, perception of a flower from the smell.
 - (vi) *Tiripukkāṭci* - wrong perception *e.g.*, rope is perceived as snake.

5. "That matter is the ultimate reality is implied from Brhaspati's dictum - 'Out of matter came forth life' - which probably is based upon the sceptical view of Parameśthin of the *Rg Veda*." Radhakrishnan, (Ed.), *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, Vol. I (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), p. 135.

6. Single-sensed (touch) are trees, grass and vegetable kingdom. Double sensed (touch and taste) are of the order of the mollusca, starfish, snails, oysters, etc. Triple sensed (touch, taste and smell) are white ants, ants, etc. Four sensed (touch, taste, smell and sight) are beetles, butterflies, etc. Five sensed (with hearing) are devas, men, beast and birds etc. Nallasamy Pillai, J.M., (Tr.), *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār* (Madras: Meykandan Press, 1913), p. 17.

7. Aruṇandi uses the word 'அறிவு' which means knowledge, wisdom, intelligence, perception by the senses, learning, erudition etc. *Tamil Lexicon*, Vol. I (Madras: University of Madras, 1982), p. 177. Indeed, all these words refer to mental phenomena and hence the word mind is repeatedly used here.

8. The word 'கடம்' (verse No. 19) is used in the sense of 'சரீரம்' (human body) by Tattvaparakasar, the commentator, while Nallasamy Pillai translates it to mean a pot. However, it may be reconciled by adhering to the Tamil *siddha* tradition that the human body is a pot made by the potter of *Māyā*, the Lord.

9. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, p. 532.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 514.

11. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 79.

12. Radhakrishnan. *History of Philosophy Eastern and Western*, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

13. p. 6.

14. II, 4, 12; IV, 5, 13. Quoted by Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. III, *op. cit.*, p. 519.

15. The *Śarva-Darsana-Saṃgraha*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

16. *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār*, *Supakkam*, 1, 1, 1,

17. *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār*, (Tr.) *op. cit.*, p. 17.

18. 2, 4, 77. *Ibid.*, p. 185.

19. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1977), p. 278.

20. Hiriyantha, M., *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, (Bombay: George Allen & Unwin (India) Private Limited, 1973), pp. 194-195.

Chapter 3

1. Datta and Chatterjee, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy*, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1960), p. 142.
2. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, p. 353.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 612.
4. *op. cit.*, p. 14-15.
5. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-114.
6. Aruṇāndi speaks of five kinds of disciplines (*śīlam*) known as *ahimsa*, *satya*, *asteya*, *brahmacarya* and *sangraha*. The word *śīlam* also refers to the five *skandhas* viz., *rūpa*, *vedana*, *saṃjñā*, *bhāvana* and *vijñāna*.
7. *Śivajñāna Māpāḍiyam*, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
8. The eight kinds of right conduct are right perception, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right life, right endeavour, right mindfulness and right concentration.
9. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, p. 625.
10. *The Śarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha*, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.
11. *Śivajñāna Māpāḍiyam*, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.
13. Mahadevan, T.M.P. (Ed.), *Collected Papers of Professor S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri* (Madras: University of Madras, 1961), p. 258.
14. *The Śarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
15. Kandasamy, S.N., *Bauddham* (Tamil), (Madras: University of Madras, 1977), pp. 129-132.
16. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, pp. 632-33.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 643.
18. Thibaut, George (Tr.), *The Vedānta Sūtras with the Commentary by Śaṅkarācārya*, Part I, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1962), II, 2, 32.
19. Sharma, Chandradhar, *A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1964), p. 86.
20. *The Śarva-Darśana-Saṃgraha*, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
21. Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, p. 217.
22. *Ibid.*, 218.

23. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, p. 614.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 615-616.

Chapter 4

1. The eight virtuous qualities are:

<i>ananta jñānam</i>	— endless intelligence
<i>ananta darśanam</i>	— endless wisdom
<i>ananta vīryam</i>	— endless power
<i>ananta sukham</i>	— endless joy
<i>nirṇāma</i>	— namelessness
<i>nirkottiram</i>	— sectlessness
<i>nirāyudhiyam</i>	— agelessness
<i>sammīyadhābhāvam</i>	— immortality.

The eight wicked qualities are:

<i>jñānāvaraṇīyam</i>	— ignorance
<i>darśanāvaraṇīyam</i>	— defective vision
<i>vedānīyam</i>	— belief in the <i>Vedas</i>
<i>mogānīyam</i>	— sensuality
<i>ayudhiyānāmam</i>	— possessing name
<i>kottirānāmam</i>	— possessing the name of a section
<i>āyavantarāyam</i>	— sorrows due to age
<i>kāyavantarāyam</i>	— sorrows caused by bodily pains.

2. 27, 167-201.

Chapter 5

1. Hastings, James (Ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. I (Edinburgh: T & T. Clark, 1959), pp. 259-268.

2. *Ibid.*, 262.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. Gopalan, S., *Outlines of Jainism* (New Delhi: Wiley Eastern Private Limited, 1973), p. 21.

6. Sanjeevi, N., *Arts and Sciences in Ancient Tamil Literature* (Tamil) (Madras: University of Madras, 1974), p. 15.

7. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

Chapter 6

1. Nallasamy Pillai, (Tr.), *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār*, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.
2. Banerjee, N.V. *The Spirit of Indian Philosophy*, (New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann Publishers (India) Private Limited, 1974), pp. 341-342.

Chapter 7

1. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, pp. 421-422.

Chapter 8

1. Nallasamy Pillai, (Tr.), *Śivajñāna Siddhiyār*, *op. cit.* p. 88.

Chapter 9

1. Quoted by Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, *op. cit.*, pp. 445-446.

Chapter 11

1. pp. 221-223.

Chapter 12

1. Nallasamy Pillai, *op. cit.*, p. 113

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